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SUMMARY

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the implementation of
site-based management leads to higher levels of principal autonomy and more
collaborative decision-making processes between principals and teachers. It also
measures the effects of principals’ job autonomy and other principal- and school-related
factors on the levels of principal turnover. The data of this dissertation mainly come from
the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-up
Survey (PFS). The controlled principal- and school-related factors include the individual
characteristics of the principal, the contextual factors of the school which assess the
physical background of the school and the composition of the student and teacher body,
and also the working conditions of the principal.
Using Wald-tests, linear regression models and logit regression models, I find
that charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job autonomy than
do traditional public school principals. I also find more collaborative and democratic
decision-making processes in charter schools than in traditional public schools. In
addition, I find that the levels of principals’ job autonomy negatively affect their turnover
rates. Charter school principals, however, are more likely than traditional public school
principals to leave their jobs even though they enjoy higher levels of job autonomy. The
differences in the contextual factors of the school drive the higher levels of turnover
probability among charter school principals.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Turnover is an important topic in organizational research, given the
organizational costs employee turnover imposes in terms of loss of institutional memory,
hiring, training, and lower levels of employee performance (Moynihan and Pandey,
2008). A rich literature has explored the individual, organizational, and environmental
factors that induce employees to leave. Managers have also implemented various human
resource practices designed to reduce undesirable and avoidable employee turnover
(Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Eberly, 2008; Moynihan and Pandey, 2008). The importance
of employee turnover has gained much attention in critical industries (Holtom, Mitchell,
Lee and Eberly, 2008). Educational researchers, especially those focusing on public
schools, have noticed the turnover behaviors of school employees (Renzulli, Parrott and
Beattie, 2011; Stuit and Smith, 2012; Ladd, 2011; Johnson, 2006; Boyd, Grossman, Ing,
Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff, 2011).
School principals play a variety of roles in the daily operations of schools, not
the least of which is creating academically supportive environments for both teachers and
students (Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and Schwartz, 2009). As school leaders,
principals select, monitor, and support teachers, set school budgets, design curricula,
manage discipline, and develop relationships with the broader community (Miller, 2013).
They may substantially influence the recruitment, working environments, professional
development, job satisfaction, and retention of teachers. For instance, principals have
been found to strongly and directly affect the levels of teachers’ cohesion and
1

commitment to the schools (Price, 2012). New teachers’ inclination to remain teaching
within the same school will decrease when they perceive having a poor relationship with
the principal (Pogodzinski, Youngs, Frank and Belman, 2012). School principals also
influence student achievement through configuring the goals of the school, determining
curricula and instruction, and shaping school culture and climate (Hallinger and Heck,
1998; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). The role of school principals is essential for
creating a positive learning environment for students, although their impact on student
achievement is mediated by the work of teachers (Leithwood, Harris and Hopkins, 2008;
Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; Coelli and Green, 2012).
Thus, schools with high levels of principal turnover lack the necessary
leadership stability for success (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and
Brown, 2006). High levels of principal turnover incur financial costs in that a school
district has to spend resources on recruiting, hiring, and training a new principal (Fuller
and Young, 2009). High levels of principal turnover may also lead to high levels of
teacher turnover, which has negative financial and educational impacts on schools (Fuller,
Baker and Young, 2007).
Job autonomy is also an important topic in organizational research. It has been
defined, by Hackman and Oldman (1976: 258), as “the degree to which the job provides
substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling the
work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out”. In other words, job
autonomy is the discretion an employee has to make decisions on the job (Breaugh,
1985).
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The research examining the impacts of work-related factors on employee
turnover is very diverse, although the results are quite consistent in admitting the
importance of job autonomy. Even the earliest research has found turnover to be related
to perceived lack of autonomy or to less autonomy than employees expected (Walker and
Guest, 1952; Guest, 1955; Ross and Zander, 1957). A large and increasing number of
studies have shown that job autonomy has a negative effect on turnover behavior (Hom
and Griffeth, 1995; Iverson, 1999; Liu, Spector and Jex, 2005; Kim and Stoner, 2008;
Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011). Spector (1986) has found that perceived
autonomy is positively associated with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job
involvement, work performance, and internal motivation, and negatively associated with
physical symptoms, emotional distress, role stress, absenteeism, and turnover. According
to the cognitive evaluation theory and the self-determination theory, job autonomy is one
of the important determinants of work motivation. Work motivation will positively
influence work satisfaction and negatively influence emotional exhaustion, which will
eventually have a negative effect on turnover behavior (Richer, Blanchard and Vallerand,
2002). Liu, Zhang, Wang and Lee (2011) have indicated that high levels of job autonomy
will increase the psychological empowerment of employees and ultimately reduce
turnover rates. Dude (2012) has argued that increases in job autonomy are associated with
increased organizational commitment, which will lead to decreased turnover rates.
1.1 Overview of the Theoretical Framework
Job characteristics theory (Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Hackman and Oldham,
1980) is one of the most influential theoretical frameworks for discussing job design in
the public sector (Torraco, 2005). It links job autonomy with employee turnover,
3

explaining how autonomy and other four core characteristics of a job (skill variety, task
identity, task significance, and feedback) influence employees’ psychological states and
their performance-related behaviors. According to job characteristics theory, jobs in
which employees enjoy greater autonomy in carrying out their work will lead to higher
levels of job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational commitment, as well as
lower levels of work exhaustion, absenteeism, and turnover (Spector, 1985; Spector,
1986; Fried and Ferris, 1987; Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007).
Job characteristics theory has gained some empirical evidence in the educational
research area. Educational researchers, especially those focusing on public schools, have
studied how school-related factors affect the levels of teacher turnover. They have found
that teachers who are granted higher levels of job autonomy are more satisfied with their
jobs and are more likely to stay in their positions than teachers with less job discretion.
Promoting job autonomy may boost teachers’ work satisfaction and decrease their
turnover rates (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011; Shen, Leslie, Spybrook and Ma, 2012;
Stuit and Smith, 2012; Ladd, 2011; Boyd, Grossman, Ing, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff,
2011; Johnson, 2006).
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions
The empirical studies of job characteristics theory have not paid much attention
to school principals. In contrast to the research on teacher turnover, the research on the
mobility of school principals has been surprisingly scarce and unsystematic, with much
of it involving individual case studies, small-scale qualitative studies, and small surveys.
The research on principal autonomy has also been scarce, compared to the research
examining teachers’ job autonomy. It is still unclear whether job autonomy also matters
4

to school principals and whether it is possible to lift principal retention rates by providing
them with greater job autonomy.
Given that the limited previous research on principal autonomy and principal
turnover provides insufficient information, this dissertation will try to answer these
questions through conducting a partial empirical test for job characteristics theory.
Instead of covering all the five core job characteristics (skill variety, task identity, task
significance, autonomy, and feedback) mentioned by this theory, I will focus on one of
them — job autonomy. I will investigate how the implementation of site-based
management influences principals’ job autonomy and hence influences their turnover
rates by examining whether and how charter schools, which generally implement sitebased management, differ from traditional public schools (TPSs) in their levels of
principal autonomy and principal turnover. A much more thorough implementation of
site-based management in charter schools should lead to higher levels of principal
autonomy and hence lower principal turnover rates than in TPSs.
In addition to comparing charter schools with TPSs, I will distinguish between
regular charter schools that are managed by local community members and those charter
schools managed privately by management organizations (MOs), i.e., for-profit education
management organizations (EMOs) and nonprofit charter management organizations
(CMOs). Charter schools managed by MOs tend to centralize administrative functions
into network offices. They are less likely than regular charter schools to implement sitebased management (Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004; Morley, 2006).
Thus, I will test, in this dissertation, whether principals working in EMO- and CMOmanaged charter schools perceive having lower levels of school-wide job autonomy and
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show higher turnover rates than do principals who work in regular charter schools.
Principals in MO-managed charter schools are expected to have similar levels of job
autonomy and similar turnover rates as their counterparts working in TPSs.
Furthermore, I will test whether the implementation of site-based management
affects the distribution of educational authority between principals and teachers.
According to the previous research, teachers working in centrally managed schools just
receive orders from principals in response to directives from the central offices. There are
noticeable levels of power differential between principals and teachers. In contrast, sitebased management encourages democratic and collaborative decision-making processes
between principals and teachers. Educational authority is considered to be more evenly
distributed in site-based managed schools than in other schools (Bredeson, 2000; White,
1992; Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers, 1996). Therefore, I expect that the power
differential between principals and teachers is smaller in charter schools than in TPSs.
1.3 Overview of the Methodology
The major data for this dissertation come from the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing
Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-Up Survey (PFS). These surveys are
conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) on behalf of the U.S.
Department of Education. They are large-scale sample surveys of K–12 school districts,
schools, teachers, and principals.
Their sampling frame was built from the 2009-10 Common Core of Data (CCD)
school survey. These surveys are based on a stratified probability proportional to size
sample, so I will use the final sampling weights and the balanced-repeated replicate
(BRR) weights within the study. These weights are provided by the NCES. They adjust
6

for oversampling and non-response. After using these sampling weights, the descriptive
statistics and the estimates of the regression models can represent the population of
public school principals rather than simply the sample.
In order to analyze the data and interpret the results, I will use several statistical
tools in this study, such as descriptive statistics, summated rating scales, hypothesis
testing, multiple linear regressions, multiple logit regressions, and so on.
1.4 Organization of the Study
This dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the research
topics and the research questions of this dissertation. Chapter two reviews the theoretical
models and frameworks of turnover research, and discusses the theoretical considerations
of this dissertation. It also summarizes the findings of the existing studies on principal
autonomy and principal turnover. Chapter three introduces the data sources and methods
of analysis, and also establishes the hypotheses and models of this dissertation. These
models test whether the implementation of site-based management leads to higher levels
of principal autonomy and lower levels of the power differential between principals and
teachers in charter schools than in TPSs. These models also explore the relationships
between principals’ job autonomy as well as their other working conditions and their
turnover behaviors. Chapter four to chapter six report and explain the results of
quantitative analyses. These three chapters answer the research questions that are raised
in chapter one and also verify whether the hypotheses of this study are correct. Chapter
seven includes the summary of the findings and also the conclusions of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Background
Turnover has been defined as an occurring when “employees in an organization
leave and are replaced by other individuals who are employed by the organization”
(Rinefort and Van Fleet, 1998: 10). Most of the existing studies on turnover, however,
focus on employee exit rather than employee replacement. Turnover costs include both
quantifiable ones, such as lost productivity, extra recruitment, and training, and
unmeasured ones, such as damaged market reputation and credibility with customers
(Winkler and Janger, 1998).
The previous scholars have developed a variety of theoretical frameworks and
models for employee turnover (see Maertz and Campion, 1998; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee
and Eberly, 2008 for a detailed review of turnover research). The earliest models were
established in 1950s. They were mainly focused on employees’ attitudes, such as job
satisfaction and organizational commitment, or the nature of the job and the employee.
Brayfield and Crockett (1955) and Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson and Capwell (1957)
found strong positive relationships between employees’ job dissatisfaction and their
turnover and absenteeism behaviors. The meta-analysis conducted by Porter and Steers
(1973) concluded that employees’ withdrawal behaviors (i.e., both turnover and
absenteeism) were closely related to four categories of organizational factors:
organization-wide factors (pay, organizational size, and promotion), immediate work
environment factors (supervisory style, work unit size, and peer group interaction), job
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content factors (overall reaction to job content, task repetitiveness, job autonomy and
responsibility, and role clarity), and personal factors (age, tenure with organization,
similarity of job with vocational interest, personality characteristics, and family
considerations).
Distinct from the aforementioned turnover content research that focuses on
turnover antecedents, turnover process research addresses how employees exit an
organization. Mobley (1977) and Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979) explained
how a process including withdrawal cognitions and job-search behaviors linked job
dissatisfaction to actual turnover behavior. Based on Mobley’s process model, Steers and
Mowday (1981) attempted to incorporate all prior piecemeal models into a more
comprehensive process model of employee turnover. Hom, Griffeth and Sellaro (1984)
proposed an alternative process model that suggests two decision paths rather than one.
Once employees intend to quit, they either undertake a job search and compare their
available alternatives to their current job or directly resign.
From 1985 to 1995, the main focus of turnover content research experienced a
shift from individual-level factors toward organizational-level ones. For instance,
organizational culture and pay inequality were found to affect individual turnover
(Abelson, 1993; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1992). Turnover research also started to
consider employees’ relationships with their co-workers, administrators, and the
organization. The models investigating these relationships are generally called personenvironment fit models (see Edwards, 2008 for a detailed review of person-environment
fit models). O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell (1991) revealed the importance of value
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congruence between employees and the organization. Employees whose individual values
do not match the organizational culture are more likely to leave.
Turnover process research was also extended in this period. Hulin (1991)
established a new withdrawal process model, which states that turnover is a subset of
employees’ adaptive behaviors. Job dissatisfaction triggers a sequence of cognitive and
behavioral responses that lead to various adaptive behaviors. Employees’ adaptive
behaviors include not only turnover but also lateness, absenteeism, retirement, attempts to
improve job performance, and so on. Lee and Mitchell (1994) also developed a new
model regarding the turnover process. The unfolding model of turnover proposes that
turnover decisions may be triggered by an external shock through multiple possible paths
rather than purely caused by accumulated job dissatisfaction. In other words, employee
turnover may sometimes happen without much deliberation.
Turnover research since 1995 mostly focuses on testing, expanding, and
improving the existing models. Scholars have conducted a variety of empirical studies on
the unfolding model that argues precipitating events or shocks more often are the
immediate cause of turnover than job dissatisfaction (Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel
and Hill, 1999; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Inderrieden, 2005; Donnelly and Quinn,
2006), and have also increased the attention paid to organizational context, personenvironment fit and interpersonal relationships. Perceptions of organizational justice,
including distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, have been found to be
important for understanding withdrawal behaviors (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter and
Ng, 2001; Simons and Roberson, 2003; Tekleab, Takeuchi and Taylor, 2005; Cho and Sai,
2013). Holtom, Lee and Tidd (2002) reported that the congruence between employees’
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scheduling preferences and the policies determined by the employer was negatively
related to turnover. Arthur, Bell, Doverspike and Villado (2006) finished a meta-analysis
on fit variables. The authors found that person-organization fit predicted employee
turnover but its impact was partially mediated by job cognitions and job attitudes. Bauer,
Erdogan, Liden and Wayne (2006) discussed the role of leader-member exchange in a
longitudinal study, saying that harmonious relations between supervisors and employees
have a negative effect on employee leaving. Stanley, Vandenberghe, Vandenberg and
Bentein (2013) examined the effects of organizational commitment on employee turnover
rates. The authors found that employees with high emotional attachment with the
organizations displayed lower turnover rates than did other employees.
2.2 Job Autonomy and Its Impact on Turnover
Job characteristics theory is among the most well-known and complete theories
and frameworks of turnover content research. It explains how the core characteristics of a
job affect employees’ work-related behaviors, emphasizing the negative impact of job
autonomy on employees’ turnover behaviors (Torraco, 2005). It posits that five core
characteristics of a job (skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and
feedback) may enhance the positive psychological states of employees, such as feeling
the work is meaningful, which, in turn, lead to favorable work-related outcomes: high
work productivity and low absenteeism and turnover rates (Hackman and Oldham, 1976,
1980).
A series of empirical studies have tested the hypothesized linkages between job
characteristics and employees’ work-related performances. Hackman and Oldham (1976)
showed that all five characteristics were correlated with employees’ internal motivation
11

(employees feel a great sense of personal satisfaction when doing the job well and feel
unhappy when performing poorly on the job) and job satisfaction, but only skill variety
and autonomy were correlated with absenteeism and turnover. Autonomy is the only one
that had significant positive correlations with employee’s internal motivation, job
satisfaction, and related work effectiveness, and had significant negative correlations with
employee’s absenteeism and turnover. A meta-analysis conducted by Spector (1985)
examined the relationships between the five job characteristics and some dimensions of
employee response (pay satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, supervision satisfaction,
work satisfaction, co-worker satisfaction, growth satisfaction, general satisfaction,
internal motivation, job involvement, absenteeism, and work performance). The authors
found that each of the five job characteristics was significantly correlated with some but
not all of the employee behaviors. The meta-analysis conducted by Fried and Ferris
(1987) found that all five job characteristics were moderately to strongly correlated with
overall job satisfaction, growth satisfaction, internal work motivation, work performance,
and absenteeism. The authors argued that the five job characteristics had moderate and
meaningful effects on employee turnover but did not directly analyze these effects. They
also suggested that developing job autonomy might reduce employee absenteeism and
improve employee’s attitudinal or psychological outcomes. A third meta-analysis
(Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007) demonstrated that job characteristics had
large impacts on worker attitudes and behaviors (internal work motivation, job
satisfaction, organizational commitment, job involvement, work performance,
absenteeism, and turnover). The authors also concluded that autonomy and social support
were the two best predictors of employee job satisfaction and work performance. In
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general, these empirical studies have suggested that job autonomy has the most consistent
and significant negative effect on employee turnover among the five core characteristics.
Breaugh and Becker (1987) asserted that job autonomy might be the most important
characteristic of a job.
2.3 Site-based Management and Principal Autonomy
Principal autonomy refers to “the ability of individual school principal to affect
internal and external issues” (Gawlik, 2008: 786). It has also been conceptualized as the
right of principals to act or move freely. Principal autonomy tells who has the main
responsibility for any specific issues in schools (Verschelde, Hindriks, Rayp and Schoors,
2012). Teachers and principals who perceive having higher levels of job autonomy tend
to have higher organizational commitment, work motivation, and job satisfaction, as well
as lower turnover rates (Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007; Dysvik and Kuvaas,
2010; Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011; Roch and Sai, 2015; Roch and Sai,
2016). On the other hand, principals who perceive having lower levels of job autonomy
are more likely to leave their managerial positions (Wilson, 1994).
Principals’ perceived levels of job autonomy influence their ability to establish
satisfying working conditions for teachers and staff. Principals who perceive having
higher levels of job autonomy may also grant teachers higher levels of job autonomy and
hence enhance teachers’ job satisfaction (Skinner, 2008). In contrast, lack of job
autonomy is one of the main reasons that principals leave their positions (Whitaker,
1995). Lack of autonomy obstructs principals’ ability to reward outstanding teachers and
fire ineffective ones (Public Agenda, 2001). Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1977) found
significant and inverse relationships between principals’ perceived power, which is
13

defined as “the capacity to achieve desired objectives or results” (Astley and Sachdeva,
1984: 104), and their propensity to leave.
The levels of job autonomy delegated to school principals vary widely
(Verschelde, Hindriks, Rayp and Schoors, 2012). They are closely associated with the
manner in which schooling has been organized. Principals in rural and smaller schools
have greater job autonomy, while principals working in schools with more poor and racial
or ethnic minority students have less autonomy. The individual characteristics of
principals such as race, gender, and work experience also affect the amount of autonomy
a principal may enjoy. White, male, and more experienced principals are always granted
higher levels of job autonomy (Gawlik, 2008).
2.3.1 Site-based Management
In addition to the individual characteristics of principals and the attributes of
schools, the degree of principal autonomy is highly determined by whether a school
implements site-based management. Site-based management has been defined as “a form
of decentralization that identifies the individual school as the primary unit of
improvement and relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority as the primary
means through which improvements might be stimulated and sustained” (Malen, Ogawa
and Kranz, 1990: 290). Unlike the previous decentralization reforms that transferred
authority from large, central boards to smaller, local boards, site-based management shifts
power to individual school sites (White, 1989). School-level control over budgeting,
personnel, and educational issues (e.g., curriculum) leads to “increased staff commitment
and satisfaction, a strong professional culture, and more effective resource allocation”
(Finnigan, 2007: 514; Wohlstetter and Chau, 2004).
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Site-based management sprouted in the public education system of the United
States during the late 1980s. The public education system then was criticized for being
highly centralized, which resulted in inertia, inefficiency, cynicism, and long delays for
deciding small issues. Site-based management was developed partly as an antidote to
bureaucracy and partly to encourage efficient use of resources at the school level (Cotton,
1992; Whitaker, 2003). Its theoretical foundation is the belief that principals and teachers
work harder when they have discretion in their daily work and that schools are better able
to respond to family and student needs when they are freed from bureaucratic constraints
(Cotton, 1992; Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004; Brown, 1992).
Site-based management has changed the roles of all educational stakeholders,
especially principals (Cotton, 1992; Rhinehart, Short, Short and Eckley, 1998). Sitebased management grants principals increased power of making decisions on schoolrelated issues such as budgeting, personnel, and curriculum (Whitaker, 2003; Ford, 1992;
Wohlstetter and Mohrman, 1993). Many principals have asserted their enthusiasm for
site-based management and power decentralization (Brown, 1992). On the other hand, the
implementation of site-based management has also created uncertainty for school
principals (Hoque, Alam, Ariff, Mishra and Rabby, 2011; Whitaker, 2003). The changes
in the roles of a principal cause an increase in overall workloads and the feeling of
emotional exhaustion which prompts them to leave their positions (Whitaker, 2003;
Whitaker, 1995). Principals have to spend more time on formal and informal meetings
with parents and the community, and also face pressure to be more accountable for
student achievement (Valdivia, 2012; Whitaker, 2003). Sometime, making collaborative
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decisions with teachers, staff, parents, and community members have left some principals
feeling like they have less authority and decreased autonomy (Whitaker, 1995).
During the late 1980s, around one-third of all school districts initiated some
version of site-based management (Ogawa and White, 1994). However, the effect of
implementing site-based management was not obvious among public schools, because
state and local rules inhibit flexible operation and management (Morley, 2006). Most of
the school-related decisions were still made by the state board of education and the local
school board. In 1991, only 5% of all school-related decisions were autonomously made
by schools without consultation with other levels of governance (National Center for
Education Statistics, 1994). Under this situation, some states started to authorize charter
schools. Charter schools played an essential role in the decentralization reform that aimed
to provide additional autonomy to individual schools (Bulkley and Wohlstetter, 2004).
2.3.2 Charter Schools
Charter schools, by definition, are “public schools of choice that operate with
more autonomy (and fewer regulations) under a charter or contract issued by a public
entity, such as a local school board, a public university, or a state board of education”
(Bulkley and Wohlstetter, 2004: 1). The number of charter schools has rapidly grown in
the past two decades. In 2014, over 6,400 charter schools had been established (National
Alliance for Public Charter schools, 2015). Charter schools have greater discretion and
more decision-making responsibility in their operations than do TPSs (Bulkley and
Wohlstetter, 2004). They are largely free from many constraints imposed by states and
districts, allowing them to shape working and learning conditions that differ from those in
TPSs.
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The physical background and the composition of the teacher and student body in
charter schools also differ from those in TPSs. Charter schools are generally smaller than
TPSs and are more likely to be elementary schools (Ni, 2012; Renzulli, Parrott and
Beattie, 2011). They are also more likely to be located in urban areas and on average
remain slightly segregated, enrolling more low-income and racial or ethnic minority
students than TPSs (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012; Miron, Urschel,
Mathis and Tornquist, 2010; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser and Henig, 2002; Rapp
and Eckes, 2007).
Not all charter schools are operated by the members of the local community.
Some states provide the qualifications of establishing and running charter schools to
private management organizations (MOs). MOs are hired to operate charter schools and
are also delegated a significant portion of decision-making authority (Vergari, 2007).
MOs include both for-profit organizations (educational management organizations or
EMOs) and nonprofit organizations (charter management organizations or CMOs). The
number of charter schools managed by EMOs and CMOs largely increased over the past
decade. As of 2012, there had been 840 EMO-managed charter schools and 1,206 CMOmanaged charter schools, which at that time took up 36% of all charter schools (Miron
and Gulosino, 2013). MOs often pursue scale-based or even efficiency-oriented
management strategies by simultaneously running multiple charter schools. Small-scale
MOs manage 3 or fewer schools, but they only take up less than 20% of all MOs. Largescale MOs manage 10 or more schools (Molnar, Miron and Urschel, 2008; Miron and
Urschel, 2008). The increasing use of contracts with MOs that take responsibility for a
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wide range of school-related activities has been viewed as one of the most controversial
aspects of the development of charter schools (Bulkley, 2004).
EMOs have private motives in their daily operations. They need to create profits
for their owners, and external constraints imposed by outside investors also substantially
affect the behavior of actors working in these organizations (Cooman, Gieter, Pepermans
and Jegers, 2011). The actors working in CMOs, in contrast, are more closely tied to the
mission and the service goals of their organizations. They are often focused on promoting
the betterment of a needy population (Henig, Holyoke, Brown and Lacireno-Paquet,
2005). Some CMOs receive grants from foundations, lessening the efficiency-seeking
pressure within these organizations (Scott and DiMartino, 2010). Regular charter schools
do not work under the umbrella of an MO, thus they do not have the same incentive to
seek out scale-based efficiencies as EMO- or CMO-managed charter schools do. Many of
regular charter schools operate in a stand-alone format, while a few work within the
context of their local school districts. These schools have more localized missions and
largely pursue the interests of a geographically defined group of citizens who share
certain interests and values relating ethnicity, housing tenure, and socioeconomic class
(Henig, Holyoke, Brown and Lacireno-Paquet, 2005).
MO-managed charter schools look somewhat different from regular charter
schools. EMO-managed charter schools are often larger and more likely to be elementary
schools, whereas CMO-managed charter schools are smaller but more likely to be at
higher grades (Miron, Urschel, Aguilar and Dailey, 2012). Compared to regular charter
schools, EMO-managed charter schools enroll fewer low-income, disabled, and limited
English proficiency (LEP) students (Lacireno-Paquet, 2006; Wamba and Ascher, 2003;
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Ertas and Roch, 2014), while CMO-managed charter schools accept more low-income
and minority students than do their local district schools and charter schools nationally
(Lake, Bowen, Demeritt, McCullough, Haimson and Gill, 2012).
2.3.3 Principals Working in Charter Schools
The information on the demographic and professional statuses of charter school
principals is very limited. The key differences separating charter school principals from
TPS principals are their average age and administrative experiences. Charter school
principals are generally younger and are slightly more likely to be racial or ethnic
minority and female than TPS principals. They also have less administrative experiences
than do TPS principals (Campbell and Gross, 2008; Bini, 2011). Bini (2011) has also
found that the proportions of principals who hold at least a master’s degree are quite close
between these two groups. Among the principals who responded to the survey, around
98% of charter school principals hold at least a master’s degree, and around 96% of TPS
principals hold at least a master’s degree.
Charter school principals also have different working conditions than those of
TPS principals. Charter school principals are on average paid less. Their mean salary
equals to only 81% of the mean salary for a TPS principal (Bodine, Fuller, González,
Huerta, Naughton, Park and The, 2008; Fuller, Gawlik, Kuboyama-Gonzales and Park,
2004). They also face heavier workloads and higher work-related stress (Whitaker, 2003).
On the other hand, charter schools have more democratic and autonomous working
environments than do TPSs, attracting teachers and principals to work there. Teachers and
principals working in charter schools have been found to enjoy higher levels of job
autonomy in their interactions with external actors and in the decision-making processes
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within the schools (Malloy and Wohlstetter, 2003; Ni, 2012; Gawlik, 2007). The levels of
parental involvement are also higher in charter schools than in TPSs in various activities,
ranging from open houses to budget decisions (Bulkley and Fisler, 2003; Bifulco and
Ladd, 2006). These higher levels of involvement may be achieved through using parent
contracts, which have emerged as a common approach for charter schools to encourage
parental involvement (Corwin and Becker, 1995; Smith, Wohlstetter, Kuzin and De
Pedro, 2011), or through the creaming of more involved parents from TPSs (Bifulco and
Ladd, 2006).
2.3.4 Principal Autonomy in Charter Schools
There is a debate in educational policy research over the question of whether the
benefits of site-based management can be achieved within the TPS systems or only
through the introduction of more market-oriented alternatives, such as charter schools
(Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004). Traditional public schools face
constraints imposed by governance structures on upper levels and rarely make
independent decisions, while charter schools are actually site-based managed and less
bureaucratically bound (David, 1995; Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke,
2004). Wohlstetter and Chau (2004) have stated that charter schools even have more
school-level autonomy than do TPSs that have implemented site-based management.
Nathan (1996) has indicated that at the core of the charter school concept is sitebased management whereby key school-related decisions are determined at the school
level. Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell (2013) have also stated that autonomy from rules
and regulations is central to the charter school concept. They pointed out that fourteen
charter laws across the United States cite increased school-level autonomy as a key driver
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behind the legislation. Charter school principals have reported keeping control over
scheduling, hiring of teaching staff, budgeting, and purchasing of supplies and equipment
(Triant, 2001; RPP International, 2001; SRI International, 2002). They have also reported
sharing educational authority with their chartering agencies in areas such as instruction
and curriculum, student assessment policies, and student discipline policies (SRI
International, 2002). According to the research by Triant (2001), the lack of job autonomy
in TPSs is an important reason for principals to move to charter schools. Charter school
principals are granted the freedom to create schools that would not be possible if the
charter law did not exist. The sense of freedom is viewed as one of the greatest parts of
taking the principal positions in charter schools.
Much of the previous work examining the levels of principal autonomy in
charter schools, however, has been based on theoretical analysis and case studies, with a
few quantitative studies that compare the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools
with those in TPSs. In a survey of the school principals in California, Zimmer and
Buddin (2007) found that charter school principals had greater control over decisionmaking processes than did their counterparts in TPSs. Gawlik (2008) conducted a
comparative study using the 1999-2000 SASS data. The results show that charter school
principals enjoy greater degrees of job autonomy in making decisions related to school
standards, curriculum, professional development programs, teacher recruitment, school
budgets, and discipline policy than do TPS principals. In this study, the author ignored the
effect of school managers on the working conditions within charter schools, treating all
charter schools as a homogeneous group. Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007)
found that charter school principals felt they had greater autonomy with regard to key
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school functions such as hiring teachers and designing curriculum than did principals
working in district-operated public schools. The sample of this study included 30 TPS
principals and 3 charter school principals; thus, the conclusions of this study may not be
as convincing as those based on large samples.
Prior research has suggested that considerable variations exist in the levels of
autonomy charter schools experience, depending on those schools’ relationships with
their authorizers and their partnerships with MOs (Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013).
Differing MOs and their distinct educational philosophies lead charter schools to behave
differently within their own working environments (Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and
Holyoke, 2004). In general, charter schools managed by MOs have less school-level
autonomy than do regular charter schools (Wohlstetter and Chau, 2004). From the
organizational perspective, management organizations have to deal with the tensions
between their needs for efficiency, control and some level of “brand-name” consistency,
and the wishes of the school communities (Bulkley, 2004). The pursuit of efficiency gains
induces MOs, which simultaneously take care of multiple charter schools, to centralize
managerial functions into network offices. Network offices can centralize data collection,
reporting, and accounting. Through centralizing the educational authority of decisionmaking to network offices, MOs eliminate the need for each principal to invest time in
becoming fully informed and weighing the options for each decision facing the school
(Morley, 2006). Because MOs pursue more centralized approaches to management, they
limit the autonomy of school-level actors in recruiting, training, and firing employees.
They may require that all of their schools use the same curriculum and instructional
approach (Bulkley, 2005; Scott and DiMartino, 2010; Horn and Miron, 2000). The
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existence of MOs has important implications for school-level autonomy in that charter
schools sacrifice some of their site-based control for the potential financial, technical, and
educational benefits of corporate support (Bulkley, 2004).
Some researchers have examined the levels of principal autonomy in MOmanaged charter schools. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke (2004) compared
EMO-managed charter schools with other types of charter schools without distinguishing
between CMO-managed and regular charter schools. They found that EMO-managed
charter schools exhibited significantly less control over school-level decision-making
processes in the areas of curriculum, testing and standards, student discipline, facilities,
and general administration, compared to more community- or mission-oriented charter
schools. Gawlik (2007) has indicated that the levels of professional autonomy for
teachers and principals working in CMO-managed charter schools are quite limited
because most of the materials and methodologies are prescribed. However, there has been
limited evidence that MOs have a negative effect on the levels of principal autonomy
within charter schools.
2.4 Turnover Rates of Public School Principals
Grusky (1960) is one of the first to recognize that leadership turnover can
aggravate instability in an organization. He has pointed out that turnover is disruptive to
organizations because it disturbs the traditional norms of an organization and promotes
changes in the formal and informal relationships among members of the system. In
addition, more costs will be incurred when the top management person leaves. Replacing
a top manager disrupts communication, decision-making, and power processes. For most
members of an organization, leader turnover leads to feelings of apprehension,
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abandonment, loss or even fear, and it also sends a signal of turbulence to outside
stakeholders (Hargreaves, Moore, Fink, Brayman and White, 2003; Harrison, Torres and
Kukalis, 1988). In general, the departure of the leader of an organization has a negative
effect on organizational effectiveness (Miskel and Cosgrove, 1985).
Principal turnover refers to “the change from one principal to another principal”
(Partlow, 2007: 60). In the educational sector, principal stability is a crucial component of
a healthy school. It ensures that the school can effectively provide a supportive
environment for improving student learning (Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and
Schwartz, 2009; Useem, Christman, Gold and Simon, 1996). High rates of principal
attrition may lead to high rates of teacher turnover and a dip in school performance
(Miller, 2009; Akiba and Reichardt, 2004). Thus, policy initiatives aimed at increasing
school effectiveness must consider ways by which schools can attract and retain highly
qualified principals (Papa Jr., 2007).
Principal turnover is viewed as a serious problem for charter schools (Henig,
Holyoke, Lacireno-Paquet and Moser, 2001); but no current research has quantitatively
assessed the turnover rates among charter school principals. Some past research has
evaluated the turnover rates among principals in all public schools without making a
comparison between charter schools and TPSs. According to the limited evidence, the
turnover rates among public school principals are high (Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin,
2009; Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and Schwartz, 2009). In the range of 14-30%
of public school principals leave their jobs from one year to the next (Battle and Gruber,
2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ringel, Gates, Chung,
Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar
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and Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007; Beteille, Kalogrides and Loeb, 2011).
Only 20-40% of the newly hired principals will stay in their positions after six years
(Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006). Using the data
from Missouri schools, Baker, Punswick and Belt (2010) found that approximately half
of principals left their positions within 5 years.
2.5 Factors Associated with Principal Turnover
As I have reviewed at the beginning of this chapter, the turnover behavior of an
employee has been found to be closely related to four categories of factors: personal
characteristics (e.g., age and gender), organizational factors (e.g., organizational size),
immediate work environment (e.g., supervisory style and peer group interaction), and job
content (e.g., job autonomy) (Porter and Steers, 1973; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Eberly,
2008). In this dissertation, I follow Ma, Ma and Bradley (2008) and Shen, Leslie,
Spybrook and Ma (2012), dividing all the factors under control into three categories: the
individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools which measure
the physical background of schools and the composition of the student and teacher body,
and the evaluative assessments of the working conditions of principals.
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed principal autonomy in
details. Job autonomy is viewed as one of the most influential job characteristics to
employee behaviors. It negatively affects the turnover rates of employees (Hackman and
Oldham, 1976; Fried and Ferris, 1987; Wilson, 1994; Humphrey, Nahrgang and
Morgeson, 2007; Dysvik and Kuvaas, 2010; Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011). In
addition to the levels of job autonomy, the turnover rates of principals are also correlated
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with the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and
other working conditions of principals.
The findings on how the individual characteristics of principals affect their
turnover rates appear to be mixed. Although there has been some different evidence
(DeAngelis and White, 2011; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007), a majority of the research has
indicated that principals who are female and racial or ethnic minority are more likely to
change their positions or to leave the system than principals who are male and nonminority (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Akiba
and Reichardt, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007, Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). Akiba and
Reichardt (2004) conjectured that the higher attrition rates of female principals might be
associated with the likelihood of young female principals leaving their positions to raise
families and with their earlier retirement.
The effect of age on the turnover rates of principals is still unclear. There has
been no clear evidence about whether older principals are more mobile than young
principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006;
DeAngelis and White, 2011; Papa Jr., 2007; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007). Principals who
have a master’s degree have been found to be less likely to change schools or positions
(Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Akiba and
Reichardt, 2004), while principals holding a doctoral degree have shown a greater
propensity to leave than other principals (DeAngelis and White, 2011). Experience is also
a predictor for principal departures. Most of the research states that more experienced
principals are more likely to stay in one place and are less likely to move (Gates, Ringel,
Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Papa Jr., 2007; Baker, Punswick,
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and Belt, 2010), but there has also been the evidence of an inverse relationship
(DeAngelis and White, 2011).
The contextual factors of schools also play a pivotal role in predicting the
turnover rates of principals. Schools with higher proportions of low-income, racial or
ethnic minority, and low-achieving students tend to have higher turnover rates for
principals (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Wheeler, 2007; Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin,
2009; Loeb, Kalogrides and Horng, 2010; Miller, 2013; Fuller and Young, 2008; Fuller
and Young, 2009; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, GhoshDastidar and Brown, 2006; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011;
Clark, Martorell and Rockoff, 2009; Burkhauser, Gates, Hamilton and Ikemoto, 2012;
Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez,
Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and Chung, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007). On the other hand, Akiba and
Reichardt (2004) found some different evidence that the poverty levels and the
proportions of minority students were independent from the turnover rates of school
principals. Fuller, Young and Orr (2007) also found that there were few differences in the
retention rates among principals working in schools with different proportions of
minority and low-income students.
Partlow (2007) argued that building enrollment, student attendance, student
mobility, pupil-teacher ratio, and teacher attendance had no effect on the turnover rates of
principals. Although some scholars believe that larger schools have a greater degree of
principal stability on average (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and
Brown, 2006; Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004), more scholars
have found that schools with fewer students have lower levels of principal turnover
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(Akiba and Reichardt, 2004; Papa, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007; Baker, Punswick and Belt,
2010). Besides varying across school sizes, the turnover rates of principals also vary
across school levels, with elementary schools having the lowest rates and high schools
having the highest ones (Fuller and Young, 2009; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Gates,
Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young, and Orr,
2007; DeAngelis and White, 2011). In addition, schools being located in rural and small
town districts and schools being located in urban areas both have higher principal
turnover rates than do schools being located in suburban districts (Gates, Ringel,
Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Fuller and Young, 2009; Akiba
and Reichardt, 2004; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011).
The past research on principal turnover sometimes refers to the driving factors of
teacher turnover. Aspects of working conditions that lead to high levels of teacher
turnover (e.g., lack of student motivation, student discipline problems, lack of parental
support, lack of influence over decision-making, and in particular low salaries) may also
affect the turnover decisions of principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, GhoshDastidar and Brown, 2006; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Wheeler, 2007; Liu and Ramsey,
2008; Ingersoll, 2002; Ingersoll and Smith, 2003; Sheppard, 2010). Hertling (2001)
maintains that lack of support from parents and the community along with negative
comments from students and media contribute to high levels of principal turnover.
Excessive workloads and other pressure also lead to high levels of principal turnover
(Brooking, Collins, Court and O’Neill, 2003; Sheppard, 2010; Hertling, 2001).
Sheppard (2010) found that salary, compensation, and other benefits provided
by the schools were significant factors in predicting the odds of principal turnover.
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Principals are more likely to move to schools offering higher salaries (Papa Jr., 2007;
Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). They are inclined to move when there is an expected
increase in their compensation for transferring to another education-related position
(Akiba and Reichardt, 2004). Baker, Punswick and Belt (2010) found that salary was the
most consistent policy lever for affecting principal retention. Principals receiving higher
salaries appear to be more likely to stay longer. Principals moving to other schools are
able to increase their salaries, on average, by 5%. Papa Jr. (2007) indicated that the
likelihood of principal retention would increase by 8.1% as a result of a $1,000 increase
in salary.
Higher salaries sometimes may even offset the disadvantages of other working
conditions. For instance, larger schools tend to have more problems, but the principals in
larger schools are also paid more. The salary differentials are sometimes large enough to
retain principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Ross and Chung, 2003). Higher salaries may
also compensate for the disadvantages of schools with higher proportions of racial or
ethnic minority students, LEP students, and less-qualified teachers (Papa Jr., 2007). In
contrast, Papa Jr., Lankford and Wyckoff (2002) found that although principals working
in the New York City and other urban areas typically received higher salaries than did
principals working in suburban areas, they were still much more likely to leave the New
York state public school system.
March and Simon (1958) have proposed that alternative employment
opportunities play a critical role in affecting the turnover decisions of employees. Some
research has found that the availability of alternative jobs can explain turnover variance
(Griffeth, Hom and Gaertner, 2000). The school-related research, however, has paid little
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attention to the labor market. Akiba and Reichardt (2004) and Papa Jr. (2007) examined
how the density of schools and the amount of school leader positions in the local area
influenced principal turnover, finding that neither of them had a significant effect on the
turnover rates of principals.
To summarize, being female, being minority, and having a doctoral degree tend
to increase the likelihood that principals leave their positions, while having a master’s
degree may decrease this likelihood. The effects of age and administrative experiences on
the turnover rates of principals are still unclear.
Principals working in larger schools and suburban schools are more likely to
leave their positions than principals working in smaller schools and rural schools, while
principals working in elementary schools and combined schools are both less likely to
leave than principals working in secondary schools. Principals are also less likely to work
in schools with higher proportions of low-income and minority students.
Among the working conditions, job autonomy negatively affects the turnover
rates of principals. Besides, student motivation, parental support, and positive comments
from students and colleagues also negatively affect the turnover rates of principals. On
the other hand, student discipline problems, low salaries, and heavy workloads will lead
to higher turnover rates for principals.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Building on the theoretical framework and the literature reviewed in chapter 2,
this chapter introduces the methodology of this dissertation in details. It begins with an
introduction of the hypotheses that correspond to each research question. This section is
followed by an overview of the dataset, including the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing
Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS). Then I will introduce
the measures, the models, and the statistical tools used to test the hypotheses.
3.1 Hypothesis
The hypotheses of this dissertation are built on the past research on principal
autonomy and principal turnover and on the work that has studied the individual
characteristics of school principals and the contextual factors and working conditions of
charter schools and TPSs. The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the
principals in multiple types of charter schools enjoy higher levels of job autonomy when
making decisions concerning school-related issues and therefore have lower turnover
rates than do TPS principals. In this study, I first consider the current levels of job
autonomy that are granted to principals working in different types of charter schools and
to TPS principals based on principals’ perceptions of their school-wide influence. I also
consider the levels of the power differential between principals and teachers in charter
schools and in TPSs, seeing whether the distributions of power between principals and
teachers are different in charter schools and in TPSs. Next, I consider the relationships
between job autonomy, working conditions, and principal turnover, while continuing to
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investigate the differences between each type of charter schools and TPSs. I examine
whether differences in the turnover rates of principals between charter schools and TPSs,
if there are any, are driven by the differences in the levels of principal autonomy and
other working conditions of principals.
3.1.1 Principal Autonomy
As I have discussed in chapter 2, charter schools are site-based managed, which
ensures that the school-wide issues of charter schools are mostly decided at the schoollevel. Traditional public schools, by contrast, face state- and federal-level constraints
imposed by governance structures and make few independent decisions. Therefore,
charter school principals should enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do their
counterparts working in TPSs.
H1a: Charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job autonomy
than do TPS principals.
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are more likely than regular charter
schools to centralize administrative functions and reduce school-level autonomy. Thus,
principals in these schools will likely have lower levels of job autonomy than do
principals in regular charter schools.
H1b: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools perceive that they have
lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in regular charter schools.
I also examine the differences between MO-managed charter schools and TPSs.
The previous research on MOs, however, has not directly compared MO-managed charter
schools with TPSs, providing me with no solid evidence that the working conditions
within EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools differ from those in TPSs. For this
32

reason, I develop a more tentative hypothesis for MO-managed charter schools.
Considering that principals in MO-managed charter schools and TPS principals are both
expected to have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in regular charter
schools, I establish a hypothesis assuming that the levels of principal autonomy are
similar in MO-managed charter schools and in TPSs.
H1c: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools perceive that they have
similar levels of job autonomy as TPS principals.
3.1.2 The Principal-teacher Power Differential
School principals have more power than do teachers (Bredeson, 2000). White
(1992), however, has argued that educational authority is more evenly distributed in
decentralized schools. In schools that implement site-based management, teachers are
granted increased job autonomy and are more involved in making decisions on schoolrelated issues than teachers working in centrally managed schools, who just receive
orders from principals in response to the directives from the central offices (Ford, 1992;
Wohlstetter and Mohrman, 1993; White, 1992). Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers
(1996) have also argued that site-based management encourages more collaborative
decision-making processes between principals and teachers. On the other hand, the
previous research on school principals has provided little evidence on how the individual
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools affect the levels of the
principal-teacher power differential. Therefore, I expect to see that the levels of the
power differential between principals and teachers should be lower in charter schools
than in TPSs.
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Given that EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are more likely than
regular charter schools to centralize administrative functions and are less likely to
implement site-based management, the levels of the power differential between principals
and teachers should be higher in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools than in
regular charter schools. Again, I establish a hypothesis assuming that the levels of the
principal-teacher power differential are similar in MO-managed charter schools and in
TPSs since both MO-managed charter schools and TPSs are expected to have higher
levels of the principal-teacher power differential than do regular charter schools.
H2a: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are lower in
charter schools than in TPSs.
H2b: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are higher in
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools than in regular charter schools.
H2c: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are similar in
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools and in TPSs.
3.1.3 Principal Turnover
The main focus of this quantitative study is to conduct an empirical test for job
characteristics theory, investigating how job autonomy and other school-related factors
affect the levels of principal turnover. I use a multi-step model to better capture the
effects of the individual, organizational, and environmental factors on principal turnover.
The first step is to make a comparison between charter schools and traditional public
schools by only controlling for the variable for charter schools. In the next steps, I add the
individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working
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conditions of principals to the model one group by one group. The fourth step is the full
model for principal turnover, which controls for all the school-related factors.
As I have mentioned in chapter 2, the information on the individual
characteristics of charter school principals is very limited. The only known differences
between charter school principals and TPS principals are their ages and administrative
experiences. The impacts of these two factors on the turnover rates of principals,
however, are still controversial. Therefore, comparing the individual characteristics of
charter school principals with those of TPS principals does not tell whether charter school
principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their jobs.
The total effect of the contextual factors of schools on the turnover rates of
charter school principals appears to be mixed. Charter school principals may be less
likely to leave their positions because a higher percentage of charter schools, compared to
TPSs, are elementary schools, while the makeup of the student body may lead to higher
turnover rates of principals in charter schools than in TPSs.
When looking at the working conditions of principals, the lower levels of
income and union membership coverage and the higher workloads predict higher
turnover rates for charter school principals than for TPS principals. Students in charter
schools have been found to make smaller achievement gains than do TPS students, which
should also lead to higher turnover rates for charter school principals. The positive effects
of these factors on the turnover rates of principals, however, may be counteracted by the
effect of the job autonomy of principals. According to prior research, the levels of the job
autonomy of principals are significantly and inversely related to their turnover rates.
Principals who perceive having higher levels of job autonomy may feel more satisfied
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with their working conditions and are more likely to stay in their current positions. In
addition, the higher levels of parental involvement and the more collaborative principalteacher relationships in charter schools may also have a negative effect on the turnover
rates of principals. The effects of the classroom control and the school-wide influence of
teachers on the turnover rates of principals are still unclear. In general, the total effect of
the working conditions of principals should lead to lower turnover rates among charter
school principals than among TPS principals.
Given that neither the individual characteristics of principals nor the contextual
factors of schools can help distinguish the turnover rates of charter school principals from
those of TPS principals, and given that the working conditions of principals have a
negative total effect on the turnover rates of charter school principals, I expect that
principals in charter schools have lower turnover rates than do principals in TPSs.
H3a: Principals in charter schools have lower turnover rates than do TPS principals.
There has been no evidence indicating how the individual characteristics and the
working conditions of principals in MO-managed charter schools differ from those in
regular charter schools. The effects of the contextual factors of schools appear to be
mixed. Compared to regular charter schools, EMO-managed charter schools are often
larger but more likely to be elementary schools, while CMO-managed charter schools are
often smaller but more likely to be at higher grades. The main difference between MOmanaged charter schools and regular charter schools is reflected in the levels of principal
autonomy. Charter schools managed by MOs tend to centralize administrative functions
into network offices and are less likely than regular charter schools to implement sitebased management. Therefore, both EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are
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expected to have lower levels of principal autonomy than do regular charter schools,
which may lead to higher turnover rates of principals in EMO- and CMO-managed
charter schools than in regular charter schools.
H3b: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have higher turnover rates
than do principals in regular charter schools.
Considering that both MO-managed charter schools and TPSs are expected to
have higher turnover rates of principals than do regular charter schools, I expect to see
similar turnover rates of principals in MO-managed charter schools and in TPSs.
H3c: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar turnover rates
as TPS principals.
After testing these hypotheses, I extend my analysis to control for the variables
which describe the individual characteristics of principals. The total effect of the
individual characteristics of principals on their turnover rates is still unclear, thus
controlling for the individual characteristics of principals may not change the
relationships described in hypotheses H3a-c.
H4a: After controlling for their individual characteristics, charter school principals have
lower turnover rates than do TPS principals.
H4b: After controlling for their individual characteristics, principals in EMO- and CMOmanaged charter schools have higher turnover rates than do principals in regular charter
schools.
H4c: After controlling for their individual characteristics, principals in EMO- and CMOmanaged charter schools have similar turnover rates as TPS principals.
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The next step is to add the contextual factors of schools to the model. As I have
mentioned, the total effect of the contextual factors of schools on the turnover rates of
principals is also mixed, thus controlling for the contextual factors of schools should not
change the relationships described in hypotheses H4a-c.
H5a: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of
their schools, charter school principals have lower turnover rates than do TPS principals.
H5b: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of
their schools, principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have higher
turnover rates than do principals in regular charter schools.
H5c: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of
their schools, principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar
turnover rates as TPS principals.
After finishing all these comparisons, I directly test the effect of principal
autonomy on the turnover rates of principals by estimating a fully specified model that
simultaneously controls for the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual
factors of schools and the working conditions of principals. According to the previous
research, the levels of principal autonomy are expected to have a negative effect on the
turnover rates of principals.
H6a: The levels of principal autonomy have a negative effect on the turnover rates of
principals.
After accounting for the factors that measure the working conditions of
principals, the negative effect of charter schools on the turnover rates of principals, which
is expected to be driven by higher levels of principal autonomy, may disappear.
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H6b: After controlling for their individual characteristics, the contextual factors of their
schools, and their working conditions, charter school principals have similar turnover
rates as TPS principals.
Triant (2001) has indicated that the sense of freedom is viewed as one of the
greatest parts of taking the principal positions in charter schools, and the lack of job
autonomy in TPSs is an important reason for principals to move to charter schools.
Therefore, I conjecture that charter school principals are more concerned with their job
autonomy than their counterparts working in TPSs. Each unit gain in the levels of the job
autonomy of principals will have a larger negative effect on the turnover rates of
principals for charter schools than for TPSs, that is, the interaction term between
principal autonomy and charter schools should have a negative effect on the turnover
rates of principals.
H7: Principal autonomy has a larger negative impact on the turnover rates of principals in
charter schools than in TPSs.
3.2 Data
The hypotheses of this dissertation are tested using the data from the 2011-12
SASS and the 2012-13 PFS surveys, which are conducted by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education. The 2011-12
SASS surveys are large-scale sample surveys of K-12 school districts, schools, teachers,
and principals in the U.S. They provide a nationally representative dataset on educational
issues of elementary and secondary schools. The 2012-13 PFS survey is an important
component of the 2011-12 SASS surveys. It reveals the attrition rates of those principals
who were interviewed by the 2011-12 SASS surveys.
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Sampling for the SASS and PFS surveys begins by selecting schools as the
primary sampling unit, and then, including the school district, principal, and a relatively
small sample of teachers within each selected school. Public schools selected for the
SASS and PFS surveys are sampled from the Common Core of Data (CCD). The NCES
collects data for the CCD annually from all state education agencies and modifies the list
of schools from the CCD to meet the definition of a school as used by the SASS and PFS
surveys. The sampling frame for the 2011-12 SASS and the 2012-13 PFS surveys was
built on the preliminary 2009-10 CCD nonfiscal school universe data file. To make sure
that the sample contains sufficient observations, the SASS and PFS surveys use a
stratified probability sample design. The final sampling weights and the balancedrepeated replicate (BRR) weights are used in the data analyses of this dissertation. These
weights adjust for nonresponse and oversampling and are used so that estimates can
represent the population of public school principals rather than simply the sample.
After merging the data of the 2011-12 SASS surveys and the data of the 201213 PFS survey into one dataset, I excluded the special education schools which primarily
serve students with disabilities and the career, technical, and vocational schools which
primarily serve students being trained for occupations. I also excluded schools that are
specifically for students who have been suspended or expelled, who have been dropped
out, or who have been referred for behavioral or adjustment problems.
The school questionnaires of the 2011-12 SASS surveys include survey items
that help distinguish among EMO-managed charter schools, CMO-managed charter
schools, regular charter schools, and TPSs. Some schools, however, did not provide clear
information on these items, thus I use the 2011-12 National Alliance for Public Charter
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Schools (NAPCS) annual data to categorize these schools1. The dataset used in this
dissertation includes 20 principals in EMO-managed charter schools, 70 principals in
CMO-managed charter schools, 280 principals in regular charter schools, and 6,100 TPS
principals (these numbers are rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES).
After taking the final sampling weights and the BRR weights into consideration, the
weighted sample includes 270 principals in EMO-managed charter schools, 740
principals in CMO-managed charter schools, 2,600 principals in regular charter schools,
and 73,800 TPS principals (These numbers again are rounded to the nearest 10th as
requested by the NCES).
The numbers of the multiple types of charter schools that are included in the
weighted sample are smaller than those reflected by national data, which shows that
during the 2011-12 school year there were 840 EMO-managed charter schools, 1,206
CMO-managed charter schools, 3,573 regular charter schools, and 90,753 TPSs in the
U.S. (Miron and Gulosino, 2013; National Alliance for Public Charter schools, 2013).
This is particularly true for EMO-managed charter schools. This may occur in part
because I excluded virtual and technical schools.
The percentage of charter schools in the weighted sample is 4.7%, which is a
little lower than the true percentage of 5.8% reported by the NAPCS. The percentages of

1

In the dataset, there are 10 charter schools that did not provide information on their
governance structure (whether they are an EMO-managed, a CMO-managed, or a regular
charter school) (this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES). So
I use the data provided by NAPCS to divide them into the EMO-managed, CMOmanaged, and regular charter school groups. It is worthwhile to note that there are some
conflicts between the SASS data and the NAPCS data. For example, some schools
identify themselves as CMO-managed charter schools but are marked as EMO-managed
or regular charter schools in the NAPCS’s dataset. Under such circumstances, I follow
the SASS data and use those schools’ own answers to categorize them.
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EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools in the weighted sample are
7.4%, 20.4%, and 72.2%, while the true percentages of these types of charter schools in
the population are 14.9%, 21.5%, and 63.6%. It seems that this dataset under represents
EMO-managed charter schools and over represents regular charter schools.
Among the EMO-managed charter schools included in the sample, 87% are
managed by large-scale EMOs (managing 10 or more schools), and 13% are managed by
small-scale EMOs (managing 3 or fewer schools)2. According to Miron and Gulosino
(2013), in the 2011-12 school year, 75.3% of EMO-managed charter schools were
managed by large-scale EMOs, 13.8% were managed by medium-scale EMOs, and
10.9% were managed by small-scale EMOs. The sample appears to over represent the
schools managed by large-scale EMOs and under represent the schools managed by
medium-scale EMOs. It also slightly over represents the schools managed by small-scale
EMOs. Among the CMO-managed charter schools included in the sample, 49% are
managed by large-scale CMOs, 35.3% are managed by medium-scale CMOs, and 15.7%
are managed by small-scale CMOs3.According to Miron and Gulosino (2013), in the
2011-12 school year, 51% of CMO-managed charter schools were managed by largescale CMOs, 30.1% were managed by medium-scale CMOs, and 18.9% were managed
by small-scale CMOs. We can see that in the sample the schools managed by large- and
small-scale CMOs are slightly under represented, while the schools managed by mediumscale CMOs are over represented. In general, the size distributions of EMOs and CMOs

2

In the sample, the managers of <10 EMO-managed charter school cannot be identified
(this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES).
3
In the sample, the managers of 20 CMO-managed charter schools cannot be identified
(this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES).
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cannot completely reflect the population, however, after using the final sampling weights
and the BRR weights, the percentages of EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular
charter schools are close to the true percentages of these different types of charter schools
in the population.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
I use three groups of dependent variables in this dissertation (see Appendix A).
The first group (Table 17) includes eight variables. Seven of them are ordinal-level
variables which evaluate the levels of job autonomy a principal may have on making
decisions concerning (a) setting student performance standards, (b) establishing
curriculum, (c) determining teacher professional development programs, (d) evaluating
teachers, (e) hiring new teachers, (f) setting school discipline policy, and (g) deciding the
school budgets. The eighth one is a summated rating scale that combines the seven
dimensions of job autonomy. It measures the level of comprehensive job autonomy a
principal may have in deciding school-related issues.
The second group (Table 18) also includes eight variables, which evaluate the
levels of the power differential between a principal and those teachers who work in the
same school with this principal. The dependent variables are calculated by deducting the
school-level means of the job autonomy of teachers from the levels of the job autonomy
of principal. Seven out of eight variables measure the levels of the principal-teacher
power differential in (a) setting student performance standards, (b) establishing
curriculum, (c) determining the professional development programs for teachers, (d)
evaluating teachers, (e) hiring new teachers, (f) setting school discipline policy, and (g)
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deciding the school budgets. The last one measures the level of the comprehensive power
differential between the principal and the teachers.
The last group only includes one dichotomous dependent variable (Table 19),
which indicates whether a principal left the school in which he or she was working during
the 2011-12 school year. It equals to 1 if the principal worked at another school, worked
on another position, or left the K-12 education system in the 2012-13 school year. It
equals to 0 if the principal was still working in the same school as principal in the 201213 school year.
3.3.2 Control Variables
In this dissertation, I control for the variables which describe the individual
characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working conditions
of principals. The variables that describe the individual characteristics of principals (see
Table 20) include gender (whether the principal is a female), race or ethnicity (whether
the principal is racial or ethnic minority), age, length of administrative experiences, and
the highest level of educational degree (whether the highest degree of the principal is a
master’s degree or a doctoral degree).
The variables that describe the contextual factors of schools (Table 21) include
whether the school is a charter school, whether the school is an EMO-managed or a
CMO-managed charter school, whether the school is a regular charter school, whether the
school is an elementary or a combined elementary and secondary school, and whether the
school is located in an urban or a suburban area. These variables also include the
enrollment size of the school, the percentage of minority teachers, and the percentages of
minority and low-income students.
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In addition to the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools, I also include the variables that describe the working conditions of
principals (see Table 22) when examining the levels of principal turnover. These working
conditions are factors that prior research has suggested are likely to differ between charter
schools and TPSs and may explain differing turnover rates of principals between charter
schools and TPSs. I include the measures of school-related income for each year, hours
worked per week, and union membership (whether the principal is represented under a
meet-and-confer agreement or a collective bargaining agreement). I also include the
responses of principals to questions asking them to rate the levels of student discipline
behaviors and parental involvement. In addition, I include the evaluations of teachers on
student motivation, the degree of autonomy they have within classrooms, the levels of
school-wide influence they have, and their perceptions of the performance of the
principal. These working conditions, which are rated by teachers, are measured at the
school-level. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether the school was
identified for improvement at the end of the 2010-11 school year due to failing to make
adequate yearly progress for two or more consecutive school years. This variable can
measure the overall level of school performance.
3.3.3 Method of Analysis
This study makes multiple types of comparisons, including comparisons between
charter schools and TPSs and comparisons between each type of charter schools and
TPSs. These comparisons are conducted by both Wald-tests and regressions. The results
of the Wald-tests are introduced in chapter 4. The results of the regressions are introduced
in chapter 5 and chapter 6 along with the results of other models.
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The full models for examining the levels of principal autonomy and the
principal-teacher power differential are as below:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
I use seven ordinal-level variables to evaluate the levels of principal autonomy.
These variables are four-level measures indicating whether a principal has (1) no
influence, (2) a minor influence, (3) a moderate influence, or (4) a major influence in
making decisions concerning school-related issues. They are used as dependent variables
in the models which examine how the levels of principal autonomy in each dimension are
influenced by different factors. Winship and Mare (1984) have pointed out that ordered
logit model “can be implemented with widely available statistical software. Most of the
literature on these methods focuses on estimating equations with ordinal dependent
46

variables (pp. 513).” Therefore, I use ordered logit regression models to estimate the
relationships between the levels of principal autonomy and those control variables.
The variable evaluating the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy is a
summated rating scale. Summated rating scales are obtained by adding up the values of
all the relevant items of a latent variable and then calculating the average value, thus are
widely treated as interval-level variables. Similarly, the school-level means of the job
autonomy of teachers and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential (deducting
the school-level means of the job autonomy of teachers from the levels of the job
autonomy of principals) are also treated as interval-level variables. I use multiple linear
regressions to examine the effects of those control factors on the levels of comprehensive
principal autonomy and on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential.
The full model for examining the turnover rates of principals are as below:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽7
∙ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
The dependent variable for the models which investigate the effects of those
control factors on the turnover rates of principals is a dichotomous variable. These
models are estimated using multiple logit regressions, seeing whether and how the
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individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working
conditions of principals affect the turnover rates of principals.
3.3.4 Diagram of Regression Models
Figure 1 describes the hypothesized relationships among different groups of
variables. The levels of principals’ job autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher
power differential are expected to be determined by the individual characteristics of
principals (gender, race, age, educational status, and administrative experiences) and the
contextual factors of schools (governance structure, enrollment size, grade levels,
location, and the composition of the student and teacher body). The dummy variable of
charter schools should positively affect the levels of principals’ job autonomy and
negatively affect the levels of the principal-teacher power differential.
The levels of principal turnover are expected to be determined by the individual
characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working conditions
of principals. The working conditions of principals include principals’ job autonomy,
income, workload, union membership, teachers’ classroom control and school-wide
influence, teachers’ evaluation on the principal, student discipline behaviors and student
motivation, parental support, and school performance. According to my hypotheses,
principals’ job autonomy should have a substantial negative effect on the probability of
principal turnover. Besides, the dummy variable of charter schools should negatively
affect the probability of principal turnover, but this negative effect should disappear after
I control for the working conditions of principals.
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School Context
Charter/EMO/CMO/Regular
Enrollment
Elementary/Secondary
Urban/Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

Individual Characteristics
Female
Minority
Age/Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Experience/Experience2

Working Conditions
Principal Autonomy
Principal-teacher Power Differential
Classroom Control of Teachers
School-wide Influence of Teachers
Teacher Evaluation on Principal
Student Discipline Behaviors
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
School Performance
Annual Salary
Weekly Workload
Union Membership

Principal Turnover

Figure 1: The Relationships among Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The following three chapters present the results of statistical analyses. Chapter 4
describes the descriptive statistics of variables, providing a general overview of the
sampled principals and their working environments. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 display the
results of those regression models and hypothesis tests which examine the levels of
principal autonomy, the principal-teacher power differential and principal turnover in
different types of charter schools as well as in TPSs.
4.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
Table 1 lists the mean values of variables and makes a comparison between
charter schools and TPSs. In the column of charter schools, the asterisks next to the mean
values show the significance levels of the differences between charter schools and TPSs.
Three asterisks signify that the difference between charter schools and TPSs is significant
at the 0.01 level. Two asterisks signify a significance level of 0.05, and one asterisk
signifies a significance level of 0.1, which is always mentioned as a marginal significance
level. The colors of those asterisks indicate the directions of differences. Black asterisks
tell that the mean values of charter schools are higher than those of TPSs, while red
asterisks tell that the mean values of charter schools are lower than those of TPSs.
Compared to TPSs, charter schools hire higher proportions of minority
principals. Around 32 percent of charter school principals are members of a minority
group, compared to 18 percent of TPS principals. Charter school principals are younger
and less experienced than TPS principals. On average, charter school principals are 46.67
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (yrs)
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students
Working Conditions of Principal
Weekly Work Hours
Annual Salary ($)
Union Membership
Student Discipline Behaviors
Parental Involvement
Student Motivation
Classroom Control of Teachers
School-wide Influence of Teachers
Teachers’ Evaluations of Principal
Identified for Improvement
Principal Autonomy
Principal Turnover Rates
Turnover
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

CSs

TPSs

0.53
0.32***
46.67**
0.59
0.27**
5.84***

0.51
0.18
48.05
0.62
0.37
7.28

425.73***
0.55***
0.23***
0.54***
0.23
27.97***
61.59***
50.93

577.94
0.73
0.05
0.23
0.27
13.64
39.52
49.05

59.14
81233***
0.27***
0.67
2.35
2.77**
3.28
2.31***
3.16
0.26
3.71***

58.45
90936
0.47
0.72
2.24
2.88
3.25
2.17
3.16
0.23
3.64

0.28**

0.22

* p<0.1
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years of age and have 5.8 years of administrative experiences, while TPS principals are
48.05 years of age and have 7.3 years of administrative experiences. Charter school
principals are also less likely to have a doctoral degree. Around 27 percent of charter
school principals have a doctoral degree, compared to 37 percent of TPS principals. The
percentages of female principals and principals who have a master’s degree are similar in
charter schools and in TPSs. In charter schools, 53 percent of principals are female, and
59 percent of principals have a master’s degree, which are close to those percentages of
TPS principals (51 percent are female, and 62 percent have a master’s degree).
As for the contextual factors of schools, charter schools in general are smaller
than TPSs. Charter schools on average enroll 426 students, compared to the 578 students’
size of TPSs. Compared to TPSs, charter schools are less likely to be an elementary
school and more likely to be a combined school. Among charter schools, 55 percent are
elementary schools, and 23 percent are combined schools. In contrast, 73 percent of TPSs
are elementary schools, and 5 percent are combined schools. Charter schools are also
more likely to be located in urban areas (54 percent vs. 23 percent). The proportions of
minority teachers and minority students are both higher in charter schools than in TPSs.
In charter schools, 28 percent of teachers and 62 percent of students are members of a
minority group; In TPSs, 14 percent of teachers and 40 percent of students are members
of a minority group. The percentages of low-income students are similar in charter
schools and in TPSs. In charter schools, 51 percent of students are classified as lowincome students, compared to 49 percent of students in TPSs. The proportions of schools
that are located in suburban areas are also similar in charter schools and in TPSs. Around
23 percent of charter schools and 27 percent of TPSs are located in suburban areas.
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Charter school principals are less likely to be protected by a contract union.
Around 27 percent of charter school principals are union members, compared to 47
percent of TPS principals. Therefore, charter school principals in general receive lower
annual salaries than do TPS principals ($81,233 for charter school principals vs. $90,936
for TPS principals). The workloads of principals are similar in charter schools and in
TPSs. Charter school principals on average work for 59 hours per week, and TPS
principals work for 58 hours per week.
I also compare the working conditions of principals in charter schools with
those in TPSs. The mean levels of principal autonomy and school-wide influence of
teachers are both higher in charter schools than in TPSs. Compared to principals and
teachers working in TPSs, principals and teachers working in charter schools perceive
themselves as more influential to the decision-making processes of school-related issues.
The mean level of student motivation, however, is lower in charter schools than in TPSs,
which means that the students in charter schools in general are less motivated.
The mean levels of student discipline behaviors, parental involvement,
classroom control of teachers, and teachers’ evaluations of the principal are similar in
charter schools and in TPSs. Besides, the mean value of the percentages of charter
schools that are identified by the states for improvement is similar to that of TPSs.
Around 26 percent of charter schools and 23 percent of TPSs are identified for
improvement because of dissatisfying performance. We can also see that charter schools
have higher principal turnover rates than do TPSs. Around 28 percent of charter schools
experience principal turnover in the survey year, compared to 22 percent of TPSs.
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Table 2: Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Student Performance Standards
Curriculum
Teacher Professional Development
Teacher Evaluation
Teacher Recruitment
Discipline Policy
School budgets
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

CSs
3.81***
3.53***
3.73***
3.90***
3.88
3.82
3.30***

TPSs
3.63
3.17
3.63
3.96
3.81
3.78
3.54

* p<0.1

Table 2 compares the mean levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with
those in TPSs. The levels of principal autonomy are measured by a group of Likert-type
scales. The values of these scales are between 1 and 4. Each scale evaluates the level of
influence a principal may have on deciding one type of school-related issues. I find that
charter school principals have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance
standards, establishing curriculum, and determining teacher professional development
programs than do TPS principals. On the other hand, charter school principals have lower
levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets than do TPS
principals. The levels of autonomy in recruiting teachers and setting discipline policy are
similar among charter school principals and TPS principals.
Table 3 compares the mean levels of teachers’ school-wide influence in charter
schools with those in TPSs. Charter school teachers have higher levels of school-wide
influence in establishing curriculum, evaluating teachers, and setting school discipline
policy than do TPS teachers. The levels of influence in setting student performance
standards, determining teacher professional development programs, recruiting teachers,
and deciding school budgets are similar in charter schools and in TPSs.
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Table 3: School-wide Influence of Teachers: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Student Performance Standards
Curriculum
Teacher Professional Development
Teacher Evaluation
Teacher Recruitment
Discipline Policy
School budgets
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

CSs
2.69
2.94***
2.42
1.93***
1.99
2.55***
1.70

TPSs
2.58
2.61
2.37
1.63
1.87
2.38
1.74

* p<0.1

Table 4 compares the mean levels of the principal-teacher power differential
between charter schools and TPSs. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential
are measured by the levels of job autonomy a principal may have deducting the schoollevel mean values of the school-wide influence of teachers. We can see that the levels of
the principal-teacher power differential are positive in both charter schools and TPSs,
which means that principals are always more influential to school-related issues than
teachers. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential are lower in charter
schools than in TPSs when evaluating teachers, deciding school budgets, and setting
school discipline policy. The overall level of the principal-teacher power differential is
also lower in charter schools than in TPSs. In other words, charter schools distribute
power more evenly between principals and teachers than do TPSs.

55

Table 4: Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Student Performance Standards
Curriculum
Teacher Professional Development Programs
Teacher Evaluation
Teacher Recruitment
Discipline Policy
School budgets
Principal-Teacher Autonomy Differential
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

CSs
1.12
0.59
1.31
1.98***
1.89
1.27*
1.60***
1.40*

TPSs
1.05
0.56
1.26
2.33
1.93
1.40
1.81
1.48

* p<0.1

4.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
Table 5 distinguishes among EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular
charter schools. It lists the mean values of variables for each type of charter schools and
compares between each type of charter schools and TPSs. The proportions of minority
principals are higher in all types of charter schools than in TPSs, and principals in all
types of charter schools are less experienced than TPS principals. Principals in CMOmanaged charter schools are generally younger and are less likely to have a doctoral
degree than TPS principals, while principals in EMO-managed and regular charter
schools have similar ages and similar likelihoods to have a doctoral degree as TPS
principals.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMOs
Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.54
Minority
0.43**
Age
44.53
Master’s Degree
0.71
Doctoral Degree
0.23
Principal Experience (yrs)
5.67*
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students
Working Conditions of Principal
Weekly Work Hours
Annual Salary ($)
Union Membership
Student Discipline Behaviors
Parental Involvement
Student Motivation
Classroom Control of Teachers
School-wide Influence of Teachers
Teachers’ Evaluations of Principal
Identified for Improvement
Principal Autonomy
Principal Turnover Rates
Turnover
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

CMOs

REGULARs

TPSs

0.49
0.30**
45.13*
0.58
0.13***
4.67***

0.54
0.32***
47.31
0.58
0.32
6.18*

0.51
0.18
48.05
0.62
0.37
7.28

672.48
0.68
0.21*
0.61***
0.32
19.99
59.06**
65.22***

435.06***
0.54***
0.27***
0.52***
0.23
31.95***
72.82***
64.93***

400.10***
0.53***
0.22***
0.53***
0.22*
27.59***
58.64***
45.62

577.94
0.73
0.05
0.23
0.27
13.64
39.52
49.05

60.81
84973
0.25*
0.72
2.55**
2.75
3.04**
2.22
3.21
0.49**
3.69

60.78
81283***
0.23***
0.65
2.37
2.68**
3.21
2.17
3.07
0.26
3.66

58.52
80870***
0.29***
0.67
2.32
2.80
3.33
2.36***
3.18
0.23
3.73***

58.45
90936
0.47
0.72
2.24
2.88
3.25
2.17
3.16
0.23
3.64

0.17

0.42***

0.25

0.22

* p<0.1
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CMO-managed and regular charter schools always enroll fewer students than do
TPSs. They are also less likely to be elementary schools. All types of charter schools are
more likely to be combined elementary and secondary schools and are more likely to be
located in urban areas than TPSs. Regular charter schools are less likely to be located in
suburban areas than TPSs. Compared to TPSs, CMO-managed and regular charter
schools have higher proportions of minority teachers, EMO- and CMO-managed charter
schools have higher proportions of low-income students, and all three types of charter
schools have higher proportions of minority students.
Principals in all types of charter schools have similar weekly workloads as TPS
principals, while principals in CMO-managed and regular charter schools earn less
money each year than do TPS principals. It may partially be caused by the lower
proportions of contract union members among the principals in CMO-managed and
regular charter schools. Principals in EMO-managed charter schools also have lower
proportions of union members than do TPS principals, however, their average salary is
similar as that of TPS principals.
As for the external working environments of principals, EMO-managed charter
schools have higher levels of parental involvement than do TPSs. Regular charter schools
have higher levels of principal autonomy and school-wide influence of teachers than do
TPSs, while EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar levels of principal
autonomy and school-wide influence of teachers as TPSs. On the other hand, students of
CMO-managed charter schools are less motivated than TPS students, and teachers of
EMO-managed charter schools have lower levels of classroom control than do TPS
teachers. The general performance of EMO-managed charter schools is worse than that of
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TPSs. EMO-managed charter schools are more likely to be identified for improvement
because of a continuing dissatisfying performance. Besides, CMO-managed schools have
higher principal turnover rats than do TPSs. That is why we see higher turnover rates
among charter school principals than among TPS principals. The turnover rates of
principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools are similar as the ones in TPSs.

Table 6: Principal Autonomy: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs
Student Performance Standards
3.79** 3.80***
3.81***
3.63
Curriculum
3.53*** 3.40*
3.57***
3.17
Professional Development Programs
3.66
3.71
3.74***
3.63
Teacher Evaluation
3.91
3.87*
3.91***
3.96
Teacher Recruitment
3.95*** 3.96***
3.85
3.81
Discipline Policy
3.82
3.81
3.82
3.78
School budgets
3.15* 3.10***
3.38**
3.54
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

* p<0.1

Table 6 compares the levels of each dimension of principal autonomy between
each type of charter schools and TPSs. Compared to TPS principals, principals in all
types of charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance
standards and establishing curriculum but have lower levels of autonomy in deciding
school budgets. Principals in regular charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in
determining teacher professional development programs, and principals in EMO- and
CMO-managed charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in recruiting teachers. On
the other hand, principals in CMO-managed and regular charter schools have lower levels
of autonomy in evaluating teachers than do TPS principals. In general, principals in
different types of charter schools enjoy different levels of job autonomy.
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Table 7: School-wide Influence of Teachers: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs
Student Performance Standards
2.65
2.63
2.71
2.58
Curriculum
2.40
2.84**
3.01***
2.61
Professional Development Programs
2.33
2.26
2.48
2.37
Teacher Evaluation
1.87
1.87***
1.95***
1.63
Teacher Recruitment
2.17***
1.85
2.01
1.87
Discipline Policy
2.35
2.31
2.63***
2.38
School budgets
1.76
1.46***
1.76
1.74
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

* p<0.1

According to Table 7, compared to TPS teachers, teachers working in EMOmanaged charter schools have higher levels of influence in recruiting teachers, and
teachers working in regular charter schools have higher levels of influence in setting
school discipline policy. Teachers working in CMO-managed and regular charter schools
have higher levels of influence in establishing curriculum and evaluating teachers than do
TPS teachers, but teachers working in CMO-managed charter schools have lower levels
of influence in deciding school budgets than do TPS teachers.
Table 8 shows that the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in
establishing curriculum are higher in EMO-managed charter schools than in TPSs, and
the levels of the power differential in determining teacher professional development
programs and recruiting teachers are higher in CMO-managed charter schools than in
TPSs. On the other hand, the levels of the power differential in teacher evaluation are
lower in CMO-managed and regular charter schools than in TPSs, and the levels of the
power differential in setting discipline policy and deciding school budgets are lower in
regular charter schools than in TPSs. In general, regular charter schools distribute power
more evenly than do TPSs since the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power
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differential are lower in regular charter schools than in TPSs. The levels of the
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in EMO- and CMO-managed charter
schools, however, are not different from the ones in TPSs.

Table 8: Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs
Student Performance Standards
1.14
1.18
1.10
1.05
Curriculum
1.14***
0.56
0.55
0.56
Professional Development Programs
1.32
1.45***
1.27
1.26
Teacher Evaluation
2.04
1.99***
1.97***
2.33
Teacher Recruitment
1.78
2.11*
1.84
1.93
Discipline Policy
1.47
1.50
1.19**
1.40
School budgets
1.39
1.64
1.62**
1.81
Principal-Teacher Autonomy Differential
1.47
1.49
1.36*
1.48
*** p<0.01;

** p<0.05;

* p<0.1
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS – PRINCIPAL AUTONOMY

This chapter includes two sections that examine the levels of principal autonomy
and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in different types of charter
schools and in TPSs. In each section, I first separately examine the levels of principal
autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential across different
dimensions (setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, determining
teacher professional development programs, evaluating teachers, hiring teachers, setting
school discipline policy, and deciding school budgets). Then I examine the levels of
comprehensive principal autonomy and the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher
power differential, which are summated rating scales combining all the dimensions.
I establish four regression models for examining the levels of principal
autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential. The first model only
controls for a dummy variable that indicates whether the school is a charter school. This
model directly compares charter schools with TPSs, seeing whether charter school
principals enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals and whether the
levels of the principal-teacher power differential are smaller in charter schools than in
TPSs. The second model is the fully specified model. The coefficients for the newly
added variables show how the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools may affect the levels of principal autonomy and the levels of the
principal-teacher power differential. Models 3 and 4 are similar to the first two models
except that the dummy variable for charter schools are replaced by three dummy
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variables which indicate whether the school is an EMO-managed, a CMO-managed, or a
regular charter school. These three dummy variables separate all schools into four groups:
EMO-managed charter schools, CMO-managed charter schools, regular charter schools,
and TPSs (the reference group). Models 3 and 4 show how the differences in the
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools help drive the
different levels of principal autonomy and the differentials in the power between
principals and teachers in each type of charter schools than those in TPSs.
The results of these models are reported in Tables 9 to 14. The coefficients for
the models which examine the levels of principal autonomy in different dimensions
(Tables 9 to 10) show how the probabilities (percentage points) for principals to report
that they have a major influence in deciding the school-related issues will change as each
control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables at their mean
values). These coefficients are calculated based on the estimates of the ordered logit
regression models using the prchange command in Stata (see the original coefficients for
the ordered logit regression models in Appendix B). The prchange command helps
calculate discrete and marginal changes in the predicted outcomes. In the models which
measure the levels of principals’ job autonomy, the outputs of the prchange command
report the effects of control variables on the probability for principals to report that they
have a major influence in deciding school-related issues. For dummy variables, the
results indicate how the probability of having a major influence will change as the value
of control variables increases from 0 to 1. For interval-level variables, the outputs
indicate how the probability will change as the value of control variables has a marginal
increase.
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The coefficients for the models which examine the levels of comprehensive
principal autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential (Tables 11 to
14) show how the dependent variables (the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy,
the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in different dimensions, and the
levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential) will change as each
control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables unchanged).

5.1 Influential Factors of Principal Autonomy
5.1.1 The Levels of Principal Autonomy in Separate Dimensions
In this dissertation, the levels of principal autonomy are measured across seven
separate dimensions: setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum,
determining teacher professional development programs, evaluating teachers, hiring
teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding school budgets. I first examine the levels
of autonomy a principal may have in each dimension.
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Table 9: The Percentage Points for Principals to Report That They Have a Major
Influence in Deciding School-related Issues: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 1
Charter School

D1

D2

D3

D4

14.4***

22***

8.4***

-5.5***

Model 2
Charter School

13.9***

20.5***

7**

-3.7***

6.9***
-1.6
-2
-2.6
-1
-1

1*
1.1
1
1.7
1.9
0

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.8
2.7
Minority
3.5
4.8**
Age (+10)
-2.1**
2.0*
Master’s Degree
6.9
-5.7
Doctoral Degree
8.4
-6.2
Experience (yrs) (+10)
2.6*
-1
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
-0
Elementary
-1.9
Combined
-3.4
Urban
1.4
Suburban
-0.03
% Minority Teachers
0.12**
% Minority Students
-0.0
% Low-income Students
-0.0

-0.63*** 0.5***
-0
-11.1***
0.2
0.7
2.6
4.1
0.3
-13.4***
0.9
-3.2***
-11.6*** -6.9*** -4.2***
0.2***
0.0
-0.0
-0.07***
0.0
0.02*
-0.0
-0.07*** -0.03**

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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Table 9 (continued)
Variable
Model 1
Charter School

D5

D6

D7

-13.7***

3.1

1.9

Model 2
Charter School

-10.9**

5.1

4.1

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
3.3*
1.6
Minority
-2.1
-5.4***
Age (+10)
3***
1
Master’s Degree
6.8
-0.0
Doctoral Degree
8.6
-10.1
Experience (yrs) (+10)
-1
-115

0.4
-3.7*
2.5**
7.3
6.1
0

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.67***
0.21*
Elementary
7.7***
-2.6**
Combined
-9.8***
-5.1
Urban
5**
-4.6**
Suburban
-2.1
-6.7***
% Minority Teachers
0.0
0.0
% Minority Students
0.08**
-0.0
% Low-income Students -0.12*** -0.05*

-0.24*
1.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.8
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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5.1.1.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
According to Table 9, charter school principals have higher levels of autonomy
in setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, and determining
teacher professional development programs than do TPS principals. Charter school
principals are 14.4 percentage points more likely than TPS principals to report having a
major influence in setting student performance standards. They are also 22 and 8.4
percentage points more likely to report having a major influence in establishing
curriculum and determining teacher professional development programs. On the other
hand, charter school principals have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and
deciding school budgets. They are 5.5 and 13.7 percentage points less likely than TPS
principals to report that they have a major influence in evaluating teachers and in
deciding school budgets. The levels of autonomy in hiring new teachers and setting
school discipline policy are similar between charter school principals and TPS principals.
After adding the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools to the model, the significances of the coefficients for charter schools do
not change4. Compared to TPS principals, charter school principals have higher levels of
autonomy in setting student performance standards (13.9 percentage points higher),
establishing curriculum (20.5 percentage points higher) and determining teacher
professional development programs (7 percentage points higher), and have lower levels

4

I have also run a series of models that include the square terms of principal’s age and
length of administrative experiences to see whether the relationships between the levels
of principal autonomy and principal’s age and length of administrative experience follow
a U-shape curve. The results show that the two square terms are insignificant, and the
significant coefficients for age and length of administrative experiences will become
insignificant once I control for their square terms. Therefore, I have decided not to
include the square terms when examining the levels of principal autonomy.
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of autonomy in evaluating teachers (3.7 percentage points lower) and deciding school
budgets (10.9 percentage points lower).
Female principals have higher levels of autonomy in determining teacher
professional programs, evaluating teachers, and deciding school budgets. They are more
likely than male principals to report that they have a major influence in these issues.
Minority principals have higher levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum than white
principals, and they have lower levels of autonomy in hiring new teachers and setting
school discipline policy. Age affects the levels of principal autonomy in some
dimensions. Older principals have higher levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum,
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy than younger principals, but
younger principals have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance
standards. Principals’ educational level has no significant effects on the levels of principal
autonomy. The length of administrative experience only affects principals’ autonomy in
setting student performance standards. Principals gain higher levels of autonomy in
setting student performance standards as they gain more administrative experiences.
As for the contextual factors of schools, principals working in larger schools
have higher levels of autonomy in determining teacher professional development
programs, deciding school budgets, and hiring new teachers than do principals working in
smaller schools. But they have lower levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum and
setting school discipline policy. Compared to principals in secondary schools, principals
in elementary schools have higher levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets and
have lower levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum and setting discipline policy;
principals in combined elementary and secondary schools have lower levels of autonomy
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in deciding school budgets. Principals working in urban and suburban schools have lower
levels of autonomy than principals working in rural schools except in deciding school
budgets. Principals working urban schools have lower levels of autonomy in establishing
curriculum, evaluating teachers, and hiring new teachers but have higher levels of
autonomy in deciding school budgets. Principals in suburban schools have lower levels of
autonomy in establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development
programs, evaluating teachers, and hiring new teachers.
The proportions of minority teachers positively affect principal autonomy.
Principals working in schools with higher percentages of minority teachers have higher
levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum.
In contrast, the proportions of low-income students negatively affect principal autonomy.
Principals in schools with higher percentages of low-income students have lower levels
of autonomy in determining teacher professional development programs, evaluating
teachers, deciding school budgets, and hiring new teachers. The proportions of minority
students have both positive and negative effects on principal autonomy. Principals
working in schools with higher percentage of minority students have higher levels of
autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets but have lower levels
autonomy in establishing curriculum.
5.1.1.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
Table 10 distinguishes among different types of charter schools and compares
each type of charter schools with TPSs. Principals in EMO-managed charter schools have
lower levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. They are
27.9 percentage points less likely than TPS principals to report having a major influence
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Table 10: The Percentage Points for Principals to Report That They Have a Major
Influence in Deciding the School-related Issues: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 3
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

D1

D2

D3

D4

15.7
14.6**
14.2***

18.5
16.2**
24***

3.8
7.9
9*

-5.3
-7.2
-5***

Model 4
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

15.5
14.9**
13.5***

24.3
14.6**
21.7***

2.2
6.6
7.7*

-2.6
-3.4
-4**

6.9***
-1.6
-2
-2.6
-1
-1

1*
1.1
1
1.7
1.9
0

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.8
2.7
Minority
3.5
4.8*
Age (+10)
-2.1**
1.9*
Master’s Degree
6.9
-6.1
Doctoral Degree
8.4
-6.7
Experience (yrs) (+10)
2.6*
-1
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
-0
Elementary
-1.9
Combined
-3.4
Urban
1.4
Suburban
-3.3
% Minority Teachers
0.12**
% Minority Students
-0.0
% Low-income Students
-0.0

-0.63*** 0.5***
-0
-11.1***
0.3
0.7
2.6
4.1
0.3
-13.4***
0.9
-3.2***
-11.6*** -6.9*** -4.2***
0.2***
0.0
-0.0
-0.07***
0.0
0.02*
0.0
-0.07** -0.03**

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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Table 10 (continued)
Variable
Model 3
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

D5

D6

D7

-27.9***
-23.2***
-9.6*

4.9
9.9
1

-1.5
2.3
2.1

Model 4
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

-25.4**
-18.1**
-7.6*

7.8
10.9
3

1.3
5.9
3.8

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
3.3*
1.5
Minority
-2.1
-5.4***
Age (+10)
3.2***
1
Master’s Degree
6.3
-9.1
Doctoral Degree
8.1
-10.4
Experience (yrs) (+10)
-1
-0

0.4
-3.7*
2.5***
7.4
6.3
0

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.69***
Elementary
7.8***
Combined
-9.7***
Urban
5**
Suburban
-2
% Minority Teachers
0.0
% Minority Students
0.08**
% Low-income Students
-0.11***

-0.24*
1.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.8
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0

0.2*
-2.6**
-5.2
-4.5**
-6.7***
0.0
-0.0
-0.05**

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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in deciding school budgets. Principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher
levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum
but have lower levels autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. They
are 14.6 and 16.2 percentage points more likely than TPS principals to report having a
major influence in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum.
They are also 23.2 percentage points less likely than TPS principals to report having a
major influence in deciding school budgets.
Principals working in regular charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in
setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, and determining teacher
professional programs than do TPS principals. They are 14.2, 24, and 9 percentage points
more likely than TPS principals to report than they have a major influence in these issues.
On the other hand, principals in regular charter schools have lower levels of autonomy in
evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets. They are 5 and 9.6 percentage points
less likely than TPS principals to report that they have a major influence in these two
issues. We can see that principals working in EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and
regular charter schools all have lower levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets than
do TPS principals, that is why we see lower levels of principal autonomy in deciding
school budgets in charter schools than in TPSs.
After adding in the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools, the significances of the variables for comparing between each type of
charter schools and TPSs do not change. The effects of other control variables (the
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools) are similar
to what we see in the models for comparing charter schools with TPSs.
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5.1.2 The Comprehensive Levels of Principal Autonomy
Table 11 examines the levels of overall job autonomy principals have. The
dependent variable is a summated rating scale which combines all the seven dimensions
of principal autonomy. The coefficients show how the dependent variable, the levels of
comprehensive principal autonomy, will change as each control variable increases by one
unit when holding other control variables unchanged.
Model 1 compares the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with
those in TPSs. We can find that the coefficient for charter schools (0.06) is positive and is
significant at the 0.01 level, which means that charter school principals have higher levels
of job autonomy than do TPS principals. The levels of principal autonomy are between 1
(no influence) and 4 (a major influence). The average value of the levels of principal
autonomy in charter schools is 3.71, which is higher than the value in TPSs (3.64). This
finding is in accordance with my hypothesis and also the quantitative research by Gawlik
(2008) and Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007).
Model 2 is the fully specified model for principal autonomy that also controls for
the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. In this
model, the positive coefficient for charter schools (0.07) is still significant at the 0.01
level, indicating that the levels of principal autonomy are higher in charter schools than in
TPSs even after controlling for the individual characteristics of principals and the
contextual factors of schools. The average level of principal autonomy in charter schools
is 0.07 higher than the one in TPSs. The positive coefficient for female principals (0.03)
is significant, which indicates that the average level of the job autonomy of female
principals is 0.03 higher than that of male principals.
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Table 11: Comprehensive Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs & Each Type of
Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Charter School

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.06*** 0.07***

EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

0.02
0.03
0.08***

0.05
0.06
0.08***

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age (+10)
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (yrs) (+10)

0.03***
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.03
-0.0003

0.03***
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.03
-0.0003

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

0.001
-0.02**
-0.03*
-0.04**
-0.08***
0.001
-0.0002
-0.001**

0.001
-0.02**
-0.03*
-0.04**
-0.08***
0.001
-0.0002
-0.001**

Constant
Constant

3.64***

3.63***

3.64***

3.63***

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,480 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Among the contextual factors of schools, the negative coefficient for elementary
schools (-0.02) is significant. It shows that the average level of principal autonomy in
elementary schools is 0.02 lower than the one in secondary schools. The coefficient for
combined schools (-0.03) is also negative and significant. The average level of principal
autonomy in combined schools is 0.03 lower than the one in secondary schools. Besides,
the negative coefficients for urban schools (-0.04) and suburban schools (-0.08) are both
significant. Compared to the average level of principal autonomy in rural schools, the one
in urban schools is 0.04 lower, and the one in suburban schools is 0.08 lower. In addition,
the proportion of low-income students (-0.001) negatively affects the levels of
comprehensive principal autonomy. Holding other control variables unchanged, as the
percentage of low-income students increases by 1 percent, the levels of principal
autonomy will decrease by 0.001.
Models 3-4 try to figure out whether and how MOs influence the levels of
principal autonomy within charter schools. These two models are similar to Models 1-2
except that I replace the dummy variable for charter schools with three dummy variables:
EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools. These three variables
compare the levels of principal autonomy in each type of charter schools with those in
TPSs, seeing whether principals working in each type of charter schools enjoy higher
levels of job autonomy than do principals working in TPSs. In Model 3, the coefficients
for EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools (0.02 and 0.03) are both insignificant. It
seems that there are no obvious differences in the levels of comprehensive principal
autonomy between EMO- or CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. The coefficient
for regular charter schools (0.08) is significant at the 0.01 level, which indicates that the
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levels of principal autonomy tend to be higher in regular charter schools than in TPSs.
The average level of principal autonomy in regular charter schools is 3.72, which is 0.08
higher than the one in TPSs (3.64). I can say that charter school principals seem to enjoy
higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals is only because those working
regular charter schools are granted higher levels of job autonomy.
In Model 4, the positive coefficient for regular charter schools (0.08) is still
significant, indicating that the levels of principal autonomy are higher in regular charter
schools than in TPSs even after controlling for the individual characteristics of principals
and the contextual factors of schools. The coefficients for EMO- and CMO-managed
charter schools, however, are both insignificant in this model. The results of other control
variables are similar to the ones we see in Model 2. Female principals have higher levels
of job autonomy than do male principals. Principals in elementary or combined schools
have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in secondary schools, and principals
in urban or suburban schools have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in
rural schools. It seems that principals working in secondary schools and rural schools
have the greatest degrees of freedom. The proportion of low-income students also
negatively affects the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy. Holding all the other
control variables unchanged, as the percentage of low-income students increases, the
levels of principal autonomy will decrease.

5.2 Influential Factors of the Principal-Teacher Power Differential
5.2.1 The Levels of the Principal-teacher Power Differential in Separate Dimensions
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This section examines the levels of the perceived power differential between
principals and teachers who work in the same schools. I want to figure out whether
principals are more influential to the decision-making processes of school-related issues
and what factors may enlarge or shrink the principal-teacher power differential. I also
want to examine whether site-based management encourages more collaborative
decision-making processes between principals and teachers in charter schools than in
TPSs, that is, whether the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are lower in
charter schools than in TPSs.
The regression models are similar to the ones used in the last section. For each
dimension and also the comprehensive measure of the power differential, I establish four
regression models. Models 1-2 compare between charter schools and TPSs, examining
whether the decision-making powers are more evenly distributed in charter schools than
in TPSs. These models also show whether the individual characteristics of principals and
the contextual factors of schools affect the distributions of power between principals and
teachers. Models 3-4 replace the dummy variable for charter schools with three dummy
variables: EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools. These two
models show us how the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors
of schools lead to different levels of the principal-teacher power differential in each type
of charter schools than those in TPSs.
5.2.1.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
The results reported in Table 12 indicate how the levels of the power differential
in different dimensions will change as each control variable increases by one unit
(holding other control variables unchanged). The levels of the power differential in
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evaluating teachers, deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy are lower in
charter schools than in TPSs. In other words, the decision-making powers in these issues
are more evenly distributed between principals and teachers in charter schools than in
TPSs. Charter schools have more collaborative processes for principals and teachers to
make decisions. This is what the advocates of charter schools expect to see. The levels of
the power differential in other dimensions are similar in charter schools and TPSs.
After I add the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors
of schools to the model, the differences, between charter schools and TPSs, in the power
differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy disappear. It seems
that the differences in the power differential in these dimensions are driven by the
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. Only the
difference in the power differential in evaluating teachers maintains significant,
indicating that charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share the
power of teacher evaluation with teachers.
The effects of gender and race on the levels of the power differential are not in
accordance with our intuitions. The levels of the power differential for female principals
are higher than those for male principals in setting student performance standards,
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development programs,
evaluating teachers, and deciding school budgets. Female principals are more likely than
male principals to dominate these decision-making processes. Minority principals are
more likely than white principals to dominate the processes for setting student
performance standards and establishing curriculum. The levels of the power differential
in these two dimensions are higher for minority principals than for white principals.
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Table 12: Principal-teacher Power Differential in Deciding the School-related Issues:
Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 1
Charter School

D1

D2

D3

D4

0.06

0.03

0.05

-0.35***

Model 2
Charter School

0.08

0.03

0.004

-0.33***

0.15***
0.02
-0.001
-0.13
-0.2
-0.02

0.04*
0.01
0.02
0.13
0.11
-0.002

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.02***
0.002
0.01***
Elementary
0.04
0.14***
-0.01
Combined
-0.11*
0.02
-0.03
Urban
0.08
-0.08
0.01
Suburban
-0.07*
-0.17
-0.11***
% Minority Teachers
0.002
0.002
-0.001
% Minority Students
-0.001
-0.00
0.001*
% Low-income Stu.
0.001 0.003*** -0.001

0.004
0.1***
0.02
0.03
0.02
-0.001
0.001
-0.001

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.08** 0.13***
Minority
0.10*
0.14**
Age (+10)
-0.04
0.07**
Master’s Degree
0.13
0.08
Doctoral Degree
0.16
0.03
Experience (yrs) (+10)
0.03
-0.06**

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.

D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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Table 12 (continued)
Variable
Model 1
Charter School

D5

D6

D7

-0.19***

-0.04

-0.13*

Model 2
Charter School

-0.06

-0.01

-0.05

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.07**
0.04
Minority
0.06
-0.01
Age (+10)
0.01
0.02
Master’s Degree
0.29*
-0.14
Doctoral Degree
0.32*
-0.18
Experience (yrs) (+10)
0.03
-0.01

0.04
0.004
0.03*
0.32*
0.26*
0.02

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
Elementary
0.1***
-0.05* -0.09***
Combined
-0.19***
-0.01
-0.12**
Urban
-0.08* -0.14*** -0.07*
Suburban
-0.07*
-0.07*
-0.08**
% Minority Teachers
-0.001
0.001
0.001
% Minority Students
0.001
-0.00
0.00
% Low-income Stu.
-0.00
0.002**
0.001
*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.

D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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The age of principals positively affects the levels of the power differential in
establishing curriculum and setting discipline policy. As principals’ age increases, the
levels of the power differential in these two dimensions will also increase. Having a
master’s degree and having a doctoral degree positively affect the levels of the principalteacher power differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy. The
levels of the power differential in these two issues are higher for principals who have a
master’s or a doctoral degree than for those who have a bachelor’s degree. The finding on
how principals’ administrative experiences affect the power differential in establishing
curriculum also deviates from the intuition. The levels of the power differential in
establishing curriculum are lower for more experienced principals than for less
experienced principals. As the length of administrative experiences increases, the levels
of the power differential will decrease.
Among the contextual factors of schools, enrollment size has a positive effect on
the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in setting student performance
standards, determining teacher professional development programs, deciding school
budgets, hiring new teachers, and setting discipline policy. As schools enroll more
students, the levels of the power differential in these dimensions will increase. The
decision-making processes are more collaborative and democratic in combined schools
than in secondary schools. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential in setting
student performance standards, deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy are
all lower in combined schools than in secondary schools. On the other hand, the levels of
the power differential in establishing curriculum, evaluating teachers and deciding school
budgets are higher in elementary schools than in secondary schools, while the ones in
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hiring new teachers and setting discipline policy are lower in elementary schools than in
secondary schools.
Compared to rural schools, urban and suburban schools in general have more
collaborative and democratic decision-making processes. Urban schools have lower
levels of the power differential in deciding school budgets, hiring new teachers and
setting discipline policy, and suburban schools have lower levels of the power differential
in setting student performance standards, determining teacher professional development
programs, deciding school budgets, hiring new teachers, and setting discipline policy.
The composition of the student body also affects the levels of the principalteacher power differential. As the proportion of minority students increases, the levels of
the power differential in determining professional development programs will also
increase. As the proportion of low-income students increases, the levels of the power
differential in establishing curriculum and hiring new teachers will increase.
The differences in the power differential in deciding school budgets and setting
discipline policy are driven by the control factors. These differences will disappear if I
add the control variables to the model. According to the descriptive statistics of variables,
charter school principals in general are younger than TPS principals (46.67 years of age
vs. 48.05 years of age) and are less likely than TPS principals (27% vs. 37%) to have a
doctoral degree. Besides, charter schools are smaller than TPSs (426 students vs. 578
students). They are also less likely to be elementary schools (55% vs. 73%) and more
likely to be combined (23% vs. 5%) and urban schools (54% vs. 23%). These factors lead
to lower levels of the power differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline
policy in charter schools than in TPSs.
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Table 13: Principal-teacher Power Differential in Deciding the School-related Issues:
Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 3
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

D1

D2

D3

D4

0.08
0.13
0.04

0.49***
-0.01
-0.01

0.08
0.22***
-0.003

-0.33*
-0.31***
-0.36***

Model 4
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

0.01
0.17
0.07

0.45***
-0.04
0.003

0.02
0.15
-0.04

-0.35*
-0.26***
-0.34***

0.15***
0.02
-0.001
-0.12
-0.18
-0.02

0.04*
0.01
0.02
0.14
0.11
-0.002

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.02***
0.002
0.01***
Elementary
0.04
0.14***
-0.01
Combined
-0.11*
0.01
-0.03
Urban
0.08
-0.08
0.01
Suburban
-0.07*
-0.17
-0.11***
% Minority Teachers 0.002
0.002
-0.001
% Minority Students -0.001
-0.0004
0.001*
% Low-income Stu.
0.001 0.003*** -0.001

0.004
0.1***
0.02
0.03
0.02
-0.001
0.001
-0.001

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.08** 0.13***
Minority
0.10*
0.14**
Age (+10)
-0.04
0.07**
Master’s Degree
0.14
0.06
Doctoral Degree
0.17
0.02
Experience (+10 yrs)
0.03
-0.06**

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.

D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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Table 13 (continued)
Variable
Model 3
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

D5

D6

D7

-0.47*
-0.14
-0.17**

-0.13
0.2**
-0.1

0.02
0.11*
-0.22**

Model 4
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

-0.43*
0.04
-0.05

-0.13
0.19*
-0.05

0.04
0.23*
-0.14

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.07**
0.04
Minority
0.06
-0.01
Age (+10)
0.01
0.02
Master’s Degree
0.30*
-0.12
Doctoral Degree
0.33**
-0.16
Experience (+10 yrs)
0.03
-0.01

0.04
0.01
0.04*
0.35*
0.3*
0.02

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
Elementary
0.10***
-0.05* -0.09***
Combined
-0.18***
-0.01
-0.12**
Urban
-0.08* -0.14*** -0.07*
Suburban
-0.07*
-0.07*
-0.09**
% Minority Teachers -0.001
0.001
0.001
% Minority Students
0.001
-0.0003
0.0003
% Low-income Stu.
-0.00
0.001**
0.001
*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.

D1: Setting Student Performance Standards
D2: Establishing Curriculum
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs
D4: Evaluating Teachers
D5: Deciding School Budgets
D6: Hiring New Teachers
D7: Setting Discipline Policy
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5.2.1.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
According to Table 13, compared to TPSs, EMO-managed charter schools have
higher levels of the power differential in establishing curriculum, and have lower levels
of the power differential in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets. CMOmanaged charter schools have higher levels of the power differential in determining
professional development programs, hiring new teachers and setting discipline policy,
and have lower levels of the power differential in evaluating teachers. Regular charter
schools in general have more collaborative and democratic decision-making processes
than do TPSs. They have lower levels of the power differential in evaluating teachers,
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy.
The effects of the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are all similar
to what we observe in the models for charter schools (see Table 12). After controlling for
these factors, some coefficients for CMO-managed and regular charter schools become
insignificant. The positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter schools on determining
teacher professional development programs becomes insignificant in model 4. The
descriptive statistics of variables show that CMO-managed charter schools on average
have higher proportions of minority students (72.82% vs. 39.52%), leading to higher
levels of the principal-teacher power differential in CMO-managed charter schools than
in TPS. The negative coefficients for regular charter schools on deciding school budgets
and setting discipline policy also become insignificant once I control for the individual
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. The descriptive
statistics of variables show that regular charter schools are more likely than TPSs to be
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combined schools (22% vs. 5%) and urban schools (53% vs. 23%) and are less likely to
be elementary schools (53% vs. 73%). Besides, regular charter schools are often smaller
than TPSs (400 students vs. 578 students). These factors lead to lower levels of the
principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools than in TPSs.

5.2.2 Comprehensive Ratings of the Principal-Teacher Power Differential
Table 14 examines the comprehensive levels of the principal-teacher power
differential. The dependent variable combines all the seven dimensions of the principalteacher power differential. Model 1 only controls for the dummy variable for charter
schools. We can find that the coefficient for charter schools (-0.08) is marginally
significant at the 0.1 level, which means that the overall levels of the principal-teacher
power differential are lower in charter schools than in TPSs. It seems that site-based
management does reduce the levels of the power differential between principals and
teachers, and charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share
educational authority with teachers who work in their schools.
Model 2 is the fully specified model. In this model, the coefficient for charter
schools (-0.05) becomes insignificant, which indicates that the levels of the principalteacher power differential are similar in charter schools and in TPSs after I control for the
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. The
coefficients for female principals (0.08) and minority principals (0.05) are positive and
significant. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential for female principals
and minority principals are higher than those for male and white principals.
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Table 14: Comprehensive Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
& Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Charter School

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
-0.08*
-0.05

EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

-0.04
0.03
-0.12**

-0.06
0.07
-0.08

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age (+10)
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (+10 yrs)

0.08***
0.05*
0.02
0.11
0.09
0.0002

0.08***
0.05*
0.02
0.13
0.1
0.0002

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

0.01***
0.03
-0.06**
-0.03
-0.08***
0.0004
0.0003
0.001

0.01***
0.03
-0.06**
-0.03
-0.08***
0.0004
0.0003
0.001

Constant
Constant

1.47***

1.13***

1.47***

1.12***

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,480 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Among the contextual factors of schools, the negative coefficients for combined
schools (-0.06) and suburban schools (-0.08) are significant. It shows that the levels of
the principal-teacher power differential are lower in combined schools and suburban
schools than in secondary schools and rural schools. In addition, the enrollment size of
schools has a positive effect on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential. As
schools enroll more students, the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power
differential will increase.
Charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to be minority,
which may lead to higher levels of the principal-teacher power differential in charter
schools than in TPSs. On the other hand, charter schools are generally smaller and more
likely to be combined schools, which lead to lower levels of the principal-teacher power
differential in charter schools than in TPSs. It seems that the negative effect of the
contextual factors of schools on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential
within charter schools outnumber the positive effect of the individual characteristics of
principals. So the lower levels of the principal-teacher power differential in charter
schools than in TPSs, which we observe in Model 1, should be explained by the
differences in the contextual factors of schools between charter schools and TPSs.
Models 3-4 examine whether and how MOs influence the levels of the
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential within charter schools. These two
models compare the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in each type of
charter schools with those in TPSs, seeing whether the distributions of power between
principals and teachers are more balanced in each type of charter schools than in TPSs. In
Models 3 and 4, the coefficients for EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are all

88

insignificant. The coefficient for regular charter schools (-0.12) is significant in Model 3.
The levels of the principal-teacher power differential tend to be lower in regular charter
schools than in TPSs, indicating that principals in regular charter schools are more likely
than TPS principals to share powers with teachers.
This negative effect of regular charter schools, however, disappears in Model 4
after controlling for the individual- and school-related factors. The coefficients for EMOand CMO-managed charter schools are still insignificant in model 4. There are no
obvious differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential between each
type of charter schools and TPSs in this model. The results of other control variables are
similar to what we observe in Model 2. The levels of the power differential are higher for
female principals and minority principals than for male principals and white principals.
Besides, the levels of the power differential are lower in combined schools and suburban
schools than in secondary schools and rural schools and are higher in larger schools than
in smaller schools.
According to the descriptive statistics, principals in regular charter schools are
more likely than TPS principals to be minority (32% vs. 18%), and regular charter
schools are less likely than TPSs to be suburban schools (22% vs. 27%). These two
factors may lead to higher levels of the power differential in regular charter schools than
in TPSs. On the other hand, regular charter schools are smaller than TPSs (400 students
vs. 578 students) and are more likely to be combined schools, which may lead to lower
levels of the principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools than in TPSs.
The total effect of these factors seems to be negative, that is why we observe lower levels
of the principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools in Model 3.
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5.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, I have examined the levels of principal autonomy in each type of
charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school principals, compared to TPS
principals, have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards,
establishing curriculum, and determining teacher professional development programs. In
addition, charter school principals also enjoy higher levels of comprehensive job
autonomy than do TPS principals. These higher levels of autonomy are significant even
after I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of
schools, indicating that these differences are driven by the implementation of site-based
management rather than by the control variables. On the other hand, charter school
principals have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school
budgets, which deviate from my expectations.
I also find that the difference in the levels of comprehensive principal
autonomy between charter schools and TPSs is caused by the difference between regular
charter schools and TPSs. Principals in regular charter schools have higher levels of
comprehensive job autonomy than do TPS principals, while principals working in EMOand CMO-managed charter schools have similar levels of comprehensive job autonomy
as principals working in TPSs.
I have also examined the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in
each type of charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school principals are more
likely than TPS principals to share the decision-making authority of evaluating teachers,
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy with teachers. And they are also
more likely to share the comprehensive decision-making powers with teachers. Most of
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these differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential, however, are
driven by the contextual factors of schools between charter schools and TPSs rather than
by the implementation of site-based management.
Like the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy (see Table 11), the lower
levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in
TPSs are also caused by regular charter schools (see Table 14). In general, principals in
regular charter schools are more likely than TPS principals to share power with teachers,
while principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools do not obviously differ
from TPS principals.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS – PRINCIPAL TURNOVER

This chapter reports the results of the multiple logit regression models which
examine the levels of principal turnover in charter schools and in TPSs. As I have
introduced in chapter 3, the dependent variable for these models is a dichotomous
variable indicating whether schools experienced a principal turnover in the survey year
(the 2012-13 school year). It equals to 1 if principals who worked in the 2011-12 school
year left their positions and equals to 0 if principals were still working in the same
positions during the survey year.
I establish two sets of models. The first set (Table 15) compares the levels of
principal turnover in charter schools with those in TPSs, examining whether charter
school principals leave their positions at higher rates than do TPS principals. The other
set (Table 16) distinguishes among EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter
schools, comparing the levels of principal turnover in each type of charter schools with
those in TPSs. This set of models may tell whether management organizations affect the
levels of principal turnover within charter schools. The coefficients reported in these
tables show how the probabilities (percentage points) for principals to leave their jobs
will change as each control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables
at their mean values). These coefficients are also calculated using the prchange command
in Stata (see the original coefficients for the logit regression models in Appendix C).
Compared to odds ratios, these “changes in probabilities” provide more intuitive and
direct comparisons between different types of charter schools and TPSs.
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Table 15: Principal Turnover: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
Charter School

Model 1 Model 2
6.4***
5.7**

Model 3
1.9

Principal Autonomy

Model 4
1.6
-4.6**

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (yrs)
Principal Experience2

-2.3
-2.5
-2.8*
3.9**
-0.4
-1.2
-2.6*** -2.5*** -2.5***
0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
3.9
4.7
5.6
4.8
6.1
8
0.7**
0.8***
1***
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04***

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

-0.5***
-2.3*
2.2
0.0
-0.1
0.05
0.09**
-0.01

Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

-0.5**
-2.5
0.7
1.3
2.4
0.04
0.09**
-0.03
-0.9
-0.9
-9.5***
2.8
0.2
0.3
-1.7
-0.15***
0.09*
-1.2

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 15 (continued)
Variable
Charter School
Principal Autonomy

Model 5
69.3*

Model 6
41***

-3.7*

-4.4**

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
-2.8*
-2.9*
Minority
-1.1
-1.2
Age
-2.5*** -2.5***
Age2
0.04*** 0.04***
Master’s Degree
6.2
8
Doctoral Degree
8.8
10.6
Principal Experience (yrs)
1***
1***
Principal Experience2
-0.04*** -0.04***
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

-0.47**
-2.5
0.7
1.2
2.4
0.04
0.09**
-0.04

-0.47**
-2.5
1.1
0.9
2.1
0.04
0.09**
-0.03

Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
-0.8
-0.7
Teachers’ School-wide Influence
-0.8
-0.9
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
-9.6*** -9.6***
Student Discipline Problems
2.8
2.9
Student Motivation
0.3
0.4
Parental Involvement
0.3
0.3
Poor School Performance
-1.6
-1.7
Annual Salary (+$1000)
-0.14*** -0.12***
Weekly Workload (hrs)
0.1*
0.1*
Union Membership
-1.2
-1.3
Interaction Terms
Principal Autonomy * Charter
-16.6*
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Charter
-0.4***
*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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I start from the first set of models. In Model 1, I include the dichotomous
variable for charter schools as the only predictor variable, directly comparing the levels
of principal turnover in charter schools with those in TPSs. Charter school principals
have higher turnover rates than do TPS principals. They are 6.4 percentage points more
likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. This finding is in accordance with the
descriptive statistics of variables. The descriptive statistics show that 28% of charter
school principals left their positions during the survey year and this average rate is
significantly higher than that of TPS principals (22%).
In Model 2, I add the individual characteristics of principals to the model. The
previous research on teacher turnover has pointed out that age is one of the most reliable
predictors of the turnover rates of teachers and it follows a U-shape relationship. Younger
teachers who are under 30 and older teachers who are greater than 50 both exit at higher
rates than do middle-aged teachers. Similarly, the relationship between the teaching
experiences of teachers and the turnover rates of teachers follows a U-shape distribution.
New teachers who have less than five years of teaching experiences have high turnover
rates. Turnover rates, however, decline through the mid-career period and then rise again
in the years close to retirement (please see Roch and Sai (2015) for a more detailed
literature review on teacher turnover). As I have mentioned in chapter 2, the existing
quantitative research on principal turnover has been scarce, thus I have to refer to the
research on teacher turnover to establish models. Basing on the findings of the research
on teacher turnover, I conjecture that the relationship between age and the turnover rates
of principals and the relationship between the lengths of administrative experiences and
the turnover rates of principals both follow a U-shape distribution. Therefore, I add the
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square terms of the age of principals and the administrative experiences of principals to
the model.
The results of Model 2 show that charter school principals still have higher
turnover rates than do TPS principals. The positive coefficient for charter schools in
Model 2 is slightly smaller than the one in Model 1, but is still significant. Minority
principals are more likely to leave their positions than white principals. The turnover
rates of minority principals are 3.9 percentage points higher than those of white
principals. Both the negative coefficient for age and the positive coefficient for age
square are significant. It seems that young principals have high turnover rates. As age
increases, turnover rates will decrease until principals become 43 (42.72) years old. Once
principals are older than 43 years, their turnover rates will start to increase as age
increases. Similarly, the two coefficients for principal experiences and experiences square
are both significant, indicating that turnover rates will increase as the working
experiences of principals increase and then will decline once principals gain more than 14
(14.36) years of administrative experiences.
In Model 3, I also include the contextual factors of schools. I find that the
positive coefficient for charter schools become insignificant, that is, the turnover rates are
similar among charter school principals and among TPS principals after controlling for
the school context. I also find that several contextual factors significantly drive the
likelihood that principals will leave their positions. Principals working in larger schools
are less likely to leave than their counterparts working in smaller schools. As schools
enroll 100 more students, principals will become 0.5 percentage points less likely to leave
their positions. Principals in elementary schools are 2.3 percentage points less likely than
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principals in secondary schools to leave their positions. Besides, the proportion of
minority students positively affects the turnover rates of principals. As the percentage of
minority students increases by 1 percent, principals will become 0.09 percentage points
more likely to leave their positions.
According to the descriptive statistics, charter schools are generally smaller
than TPSs (426 students vs. 578 students) and are less likely to be elementary schools
(55% vs. 73%). They also have higher proportions of minority students (61.59% vs.
39.52%). Given that principals are more likely to stay in larger schools, elementary
schools and schools with less minority students, the differences in the contextual factors
of schools between charter schools and TPSs appear to explain why we see higher
turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals. The results for
the individual characteristics of principals are similar to what we observe in Model 2
except that the coefficient for minority principals becomes insignificant.
In Model 4, I expand the model and also control for the working conditions of
principals. This is the fully specified model for principal turnover. I find that the levels of
principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations of the principal negatively affect the
turnover rates of principals. As the levels of principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations
of the principal increases by 1 level, the turnover rates of principals will decrease by 4.6
and 9.5 percentage points. Annual salaries also negatively affect the turnover rates of
principals. As principals earn $1000 more, their turnover rates will decrease by 0.15
percentage points. In contrast, weekly workloads positively affect the turnover rates of
principals. As principals work for 1 more hour in each week, their turnover rates will
increase by 0.09 percentage points.
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The results of other control variables are similar to the ones we observe in
Model 3 except for two variables. The negative coefficient for elementary schools
becomes insignificant, while the negative coefficient for female principals becomes
significant. The turnover rates of female principals are 2.8 percentage points lower than
those of male principals. Compared to Model 3, we see a decrease in the coefficient for
charter schools in Model 4, signifying that the higher turnover rates among charter school
principals can be partially explained by the differences in the working conditions of
principals. Charter school principals have higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS
principals, leading to lower turnover rates among charter school principals. The negative
effect of principal autonomy, however, is outnumbered by the effect of annual salaries.
Charter school principals receive lower levels of payment than do TPS principals, thus
tend to have higher turnover rates.
In Models 5 and 6, I examine whether differences exist between charter
schools and TPSs in the effects of working conditions on the turnover rates of principals,
considering both the factor that helps increase their turnover rates (weekly workloads)
and those that help decrease their turnover rates (principal autonomy, teachers’
evaluations of the principal, annual salaries). I have run a series of models that I do not
report here in which I add in the interaction terms between charter schools and the
working conditions of principals one by one. I find that only two of these interaction
terms are significant. In Model 5, I control for the interaction term between charter
schools and the levels of principal autonomy, seeing whether the slopes of principal
autonomy are different for charter school principals and for TPS principals. I find a
negative and significant interaction between charter schools and the levels of principal
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autonomy, signifying that principal autonomy has a greater effect on the turnover rates of
principals in charter schools than in TPSs. We can say that the levels of principal
autonomy are more influential to charter school principals than to TPS principals. This
finding can substantiate my hypothesis. In Model 6, I find a negative interaction between
charter schools and annual salaries, indicating that payment has a greater effect on the
turnover rates of charter school principals than that of TPS principals.
The results of the second set of models are reported in Table 16. This set of
models is the same as the first set, but I replace the charter school variable with three
dichotomous variables that indicate whether the school is a regular charter school or
managed by an EMO or a CMO. In Model 1, the coefficients for EMO-managed and
regular charter schools are insignificant, which means that principals in EMO-managed
and regular charter schools have similar turnover rates as TPS principals. The turnover
rates among principals in CMO-managed charter schools, however, appear to be higher
than those among TPS principals. Principals in CMO-managed charter schools are 19.9
percentage points more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions.
In Models 2 and 3, we can still see higher turnover rates among principals in
CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals, and the turnover rates of
principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools are similar to those in TPSs.
Minority principals, the square term of age, and administrative experiences positively
affect the turnover rates of principals, while age and the square term of administrative
experiences negatively affect turnover rates. Among the contextual factors of schools,
enrollment size and elementary schools negatively affect turnover rates, and the
proportion of minority students positively affects the turnover rates of principals.
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Table 16: Principal Turnover: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

Model 1 Model 2
3.3
3
19.9*** 19.3***
2.9
2.6

Model 3
2.4
13.3***
-0.9

Principal Autonomy
Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (yrs)
Principal Experience2

Model 4
2
12**
-1.1
-4.6**

-2.3
-2.5
-2.8*
4**
-0.2
-1
-2.4*** -2.4*** -2.4***
0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04***
5.6
6.2
7
6.6
7.7
9.6
0.7**
0.8***
1***
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04***

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

-0.5***
-2.3*
2.1
0.1
-0.2
0.05
0.09**
-0.01

Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

-0.5**
-2.5
0.6
1.4
2.4
0.04
0.09**
-0.04
-0.9
-0.8
-9.5***
2.8
0.2
0.2
-1.6
-0.15***
0.09*
-1.2

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 16 (continued)
Variable
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

Model 5
121.7**
45.9**
27.8*

Principal Autonomy

-4.6*

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Principal Experience (yrs)
Principal Experience2

-3.1*
-1
-2.4***
0.03***
8*
10.3**
1***
-0.04***

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

-0.47***
-2.5
1.1
0.9
2
0.04
0.09**
-0.03

Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

-0.8
-0.8
-10.3***
2.9
0.5
0.3
-1.7
-0.12***
0.09
-1.4

Interaction Terms
Annual Salary (+$1000) * EMO Charter
Annual Salary (+$1000) * CMO Charter
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Regular Charter

-1***
-0.39
-0.35*

*** p<0.01;
** p<0.05;
* p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Model 4 is the fully specified model which also controls for the working
conditions of principals. In Model 4, principals in CMO-managed charter schools still
exit at higher rates than do their counterparts working in TPSs. Principals working in
EMO-managed and regular charter schools and TPS principals appear to have similar
turnover rates. Principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations of the principal both have a
negative effect on the turnover rates of principals. As the levels of principal autonomy
and teachers’ evaluations of the principal increase by 1 level, the turnover rates of
principals will decrease by 4.6 and 9.5 percentage points. Besides, annual salaries
negatively affect the turnover rates of principals, while weekly workloads positively
affect their turnover rates. As principals earn $1000 more, their turnover rates will
decrease by 0.15 percentage points. In contrast, as the weekly workloads increase by 1
hour, their turnover rates will increase by 0.09 percentage points. The results of the
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools are similar to
the ones we observe in the fully specified model in Table 15.
The positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter schools keeps decreasing
from Model 1 to Model 4. We can see that the higher turnover rates among principals in
CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals can be partially explained by
the differences in the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of
schools, and the working conditions of principals. Compared to TPS principals, principals
in CMO-managed charter schools are much younger and more likely to be minority. They
also earn less than do TPS principals. Besides, CMO-managed charter schools are smaller
than TPSs and are less likely to be elementary schools. They also enroll higher
proportions of minority students. All these differences will lead to higher turnover rates
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among principals in CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals. These
observed factors, however, cannot explain all of the differences in the turnover rates of
principals. The turnover rates of principals still appear to be higher in CMO-managed
charter schools than in TPSs even after I control for all these visible factors. There must
be some unobservable or immeasurable factors that help drive the higher turnover rates
among principals in CMO-managed charter schools.
Similarly, I examine whether differences exist between each type of charter
schools and TPSs in the effects of the working conditions of principals on their turnover
rates. I have run another series of models in which I add in the interaction terms between
each type of charter schools and the working conditions of principals one by one. I find
that only the interaction term between EMO-managed charter schools and the annual
salaries of principals and the one between regular charter schools and the annual salaries
of principals are significant. These two negative coefficients signify that annual salaries
have greater effects on the turnover rates of principals working in EMO-managed and
regular charter schools than those of principals working in TPSs. We can say that annual
salaries are more influential to principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools
than to TPS principals. The interaction term between CMO-managed charter schools and
annual salaries, however, is insignificant. As for principal autonomy, I have examined the
interaction terms between the levels of principal autonomy and each type of charter
schools. Although the interaction term between principal autonomy and charter school is
significant in the first set of principal turnover models, the interaction terms between
principal autonomy and EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter schools are
insignificant in this set of models.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have explored the levels of principal autonomy in charter
schools and compared them with those in TPSs. I have also explored the levels of the
principal-teacher power differential in charter schools and in TPSs. I have observed
whether implementing site-based management may grant a more even distribution of
power between principals and teachers in charter schools than in TPSs. In addition, I have
explored the turnover rates of public school principals. I have investigated whether and
how the individual characteristics and the working conditions of principals as well as the
contextual factors of schools affect the turnover rates of school principals. I have
conducted comparisons between charter schools and TPSs, examining whether charter
school principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions.
Besides comparing charter schools with TPSs, I have also distinguished among
for-profit EMO-managed charter schools, nonprofit CMO-managed charter schools and
regular charter schools. I have examined whether management organizations decrease the
levels of principal autonomy and increase the levels of the principal-teacher power
differential within charter schools. I have also examined whether principals in EMO- and
CMO-managed charter schools exit at higher rates than do principals in regular charter
schools and TPSs.
7.1 Charter School Principals Enjoy Higher Levels of Job Autonomy
I have explored the levels of principal autonomy in both charter schools and
TPSs. I find that charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job
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autonomy than do TPS principals. Compared to TPS principals, charter school principals
have higher levels of autonomy in setting performance standards for students,
establishing curriculum, and determining professional development programs for
teachers. Although they also have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and
deciding school budgets than do TPS principals, the levels of comprehensive principal
autonomy appear to be higher in charter schools than in TPSs. The levels of
comprehensive principal autonomy are measured by a summated rating that combines
multiple dimensions of principal autonomy, including setting performance standards for
teachers, establishing curriculum, determining professional development programs for
teachers, evaluating teachers, hiring new teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding
school budgets. The higher levels of comprehensive principal autonomy in charter
schools than in TPSs maintain even after I control for the individual characteristics of
principals and the contextual factors of schools.
I have also distinguished among for-profit EMO-managed charter schools,
nonprofit CMO-managed charter schools and regular charter schools. I find that
principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting
performance standards for students and establishing curriculum and have lower levels of
autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. Principals in EMOmanaged charter schools have lower levels of job autonomy in deciding the school
budgets than do TPS principals. The levels of their autonomy in other dimensions of
principal autonomy are similar to those of TPS principals. Principals in regular charter
schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting performance standards for students,
establishing curriculum and determining professional development programs for teachers
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than do TPSs, and they have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and
deciding school budgets. As for the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy,
principals in regular charter schools perceive that they have higher levels of job
autonomy than do TPS principals. The levels of comprehensive principal autonomy in
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools, however, are not obviously different from
those in TPSs. In other words, among all charter school principals, those who work in
regular charter schools enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals, and
those who work in MO-managed charter schools have similar levels of job autonomy as
their counterparts working in TPSs. We have observed higher levels of principal
autonomy in charter schools than in TPSs because principals in regular charter schools,
who take up the majority of charter school principals, have higher levels of job autonomy
than do TPS principals.
The individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools
also affect the levels of principal autonomy. I find that female principals on average have
higher levels of job autonomy than do male principals. On the other hand, principals in
elementary schools and combined schools both have lower levels of job autonomy than
do principals in secondary schools. Principals in urban schools and suburban schools both
have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in rural schools. The proportions of
low-income students in the schools negatively affect the levels of principal autonomy. As
the percentage of low-income students increases, the levels of principal autonomy will
decrease.
The findings of this dissertation are generally in accordance with those of prior
research on the job autonomy of principals. According to Gawlik (2008), principals
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working in rural schools have more job autonomy, while principals working in schools
with more poor and minority students have less job autonomy. I find, in this study, that
principals in rural schools have greater job autonomy than do principals in urban and
suburban schools, and principals working in schools with higher proportions of lowincome students tend to have lower levels of job autonomy. Gawlik (2008) has also found
that white, male and more experienced principals are granted higher levels of job
autonomy; however, I find that female principals perceive that they have higher levels of
job autonomy than do their male counterparts. Compared to male principals, female
principals have higher levels of influence in determining professional development
programs for teachers, evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets, and they also
have higher levels of comprehensive job autonomy.
As I have reviewed in chapter 2, the existing studies examining the levels of
principal autonomy in charter schools have been scarce, and only a few are quantitative
studies that compare the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with those in
TPSs. Gawlik (2008) found that charter school principals, compared to TPS principals,
were granted greater degrees of autonomy in making decisions related to school
standards, curriculum, professional development programs, teacher recruitment, school
budgets, and discipline policy. Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007) found that
charter school principals perceived that they had greater autonomy in hiring teachers and
designing curriculum than did TPS principals.
In this dissertation, I find that charter school principals have higher levels of
autonomy in making decisions related to student performance standards, school
curriculum and teacher professional development programs but have lower levels of job
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autonomy in determining teacher evaluation and school budgets than do TPS principals. I
also find that the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy are higher in charter
schools than in TPSs, which is in accordance with the results of Gawlik (2008) and
Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007).
The findings of this dissertation also fill a gap in the research on principal
autonomy. Prior research has not provided a clear evidence that whether MO-managed
charter schools have lower levels of principal autonomy than do regular charter schools
and TPSs. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke (2004) compared the levels of
school autonomy of EMO-managed charter schools with those of CMO-managed and
regular charter schools, finding that EMO-managed charter schools have less autonomy
with regard to curriculum, testing and standards, student discipline, facilities and general
administration. Their research, however, does not directly focus on principal autonomy
but examines school-level autonomy instead. In this dissertation, I have directly
measured the levels of principal autonomy in each type of charter school, finding that the
levels of principal autonomy in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are similar to
those in TPSs and are lower than those in regular charter schools.
Gross (2011) has discussed how the greater degrees of school-level autonomy in
charter schools affect the roles of principals. Charter schools offer their principals the
opportunity to focus on a specific student group, hire the teachers they want and
sometimes dismiss those they do not want, work with their staff to determine the best
curriculum, and restructure the school day. These practices are not easy or even possible
for TPS principals. Charter school principals not only play the role of instructional
leadership, but also provide strong organizational management and act as the political
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buffer between the schools and broader educational communities. These principals have
considerable room to both rethink the way the staffs and communities engage in
leadership activities and develop new partnerships to help support the schools. On the
other hand, Gross (2011) has also mentioned that the new opportunities unlocked by
autonomy also encounter new challenges. With greater autonomy come more tasks and
responsibilities. Charter school principals need to create and support a vision, build a
staff, manage budgets, deal with payroll and facilities management, and take care of the
school’s marketing and student recruitment. These practices bring a host of added
responsibilities, and many charter school principals are struggling with these demands. To
support these principals, authorizers of charter schools need to look closely for building
and implementing a clear and achievable mission. Training programs need to be scaled up
to provide specialized and sufficient training for school principals who are faced with
increasing demands. Besides, states need to improve the reliability and stability of charter
school funding, taking the burden of fund raising off the hands of charter school
principals.
How the higher levels of school-level autonomy affect student achievement has
not been determined (Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013). Adamowski, Therriault and
Cavanna (2007) found that two-thirds of charter school principals reported that having
autonomy was necessary in raising student achievement. Zimmer and Buddin (2007),
however, stated that the differences in school-level autonomy between charter schools
and TPSs did not translate into differences in high school test scores. Based on the
findings of the previous research on principal autonomy and also the findings of this
dissertation, a critical question can be raised. Are principals and teachers in charter
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schools truly utilizing the higher levels of autonomy as a tool for improving student
achievement, or are higher levels of autonomy only granted but not used? Wohlstetter,
Smith and Farrell (2013) have mentioned that although state laws grant charter schools
greater degrees of autonomy, not all schools take advantage of this freedom to conduct
school business in innovative ways. The relationships between autonomy and
accountability and between autonomy and the growth of charter districts, how to react to
potential barriers inhibiting autonomy, and how to link the higher levels of school-level
autonomy to better student performance need further investigations.
7.2 The Principal-teacher Power Differential Is Smaller in Charter Schools
In this study, I have also explored the levels of the principal-teacher power
differential in charter schools and in TPSs. I find that the levels of the principal-teacher
power differential in evaluating teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding school
budgets are lower in charter schools than in TPSs. Most of these differences, however,
disappear once I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual
factors of schools. Only the differences in teacher evaluation remain after I add in the
control variables. The levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential
are lower in charter schools than in TPSs, but these differences also become insignificant
in the fully specified model. It seems that the differences in the contextual factors of
schools between charter schools and TPSs help drive the lower levels of the principalteacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs.
Among the controlled principal- and school-related factors, the levels of the
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential tend to be higher for female and
minority principals than for male and white principals. Female principals are more
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dominating than male principals in the processes of setting performance standards for
students, establishing curriculum, determining professional development programs for
teachers, evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets; minority principals are more
dominating than white principals in the processes of setting student performance
standards and establishing curriculum. The enrollment size of schools positively affects
the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential. Larger schools have
higher levels of power differential than do small schools. Besides, the levels of the
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential appear to be lower in combined
elementary and secondary schools and suburban schools than in secondary schools and
rural schools.
In the models comparing the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher
power differential in charter schools with those in TPSs, the negative coefficient for
charter schools is marginally significant in Model 1 but becomes insignificant in the fully
specified model which also controls for the individual characteristics of principals and the
contextual factors of schools. As I have mentioned in chapter 4, charter schools on
average are smaller and more likely to be combined schools than TPSs (see the
descriptive statistics of variables), which may lead to lower levels of the comprehensive
principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs. So the lower levels
of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools, which are
observed in Model 1, appear to be driven by the differences in the contextual factors of
schools.
After distinguishing between MO-managed and regular charter schools, I find
that the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in regular
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charter schools appear to be lower than those in TPSs, while the ones in EMO- and
CMO-managed charter schools are both similar to those in TPSs. Like the negative
coefficient for charter schools, the negative coefficient for regular charter schools also
becomes insignificant in the fully specified model that controls for the individual
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. We can say that the
lower levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools,
which are compared with those in TPSs, are led by the lower levels of the comprehensive
principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools.
The previous research has argued that educational authority is more evenly
distributed in site-based managed schools than in schools that strictly follow the
instructions coming from the local school boards and the state boards of education
(White, 1992; Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers, 1996). Charter schools are
designed to implement site-based management, thus are expected to have more
collaborative and democratic processes of deciding school-related issues. Among all
charter schools, EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are often centrally managed
by network offices and are less likely than regular charter schools to implement sitebased management, thus the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are
expected to be higher in MO-managed charter schools than in regular charter schools.
The findings of this dissertation support these hypotheses. I see lower levels of
the principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs, indicating that
charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share educational
authority with teachers, in particular in evaluating teachers, setting discipline policy and
deciding school budgets. I also see that the levels of the principal-teacher power
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differential in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are similar to those in TPSs and
are higher than the ones in regular charter schools. The only problem is that the
differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential between charter
schools and TPSs become unobvious if I control for the individual characteristics of
principals and the contextual factors of schools. It seems that the differences in the levels
of the principal-teacher power differential are not caused by the differences in school
philosophy or governance structure but by the differences in principals’ demographic
statuses and schools’ contextual factors. According to this finding, the decision making
processes of TPSs can become as collaborative and democratic as the ones of charter
schools once TPSs enroll fewer students, enroll students at lower grades and locate
themselves in suburban areas.
Prior research on charter schools has found that charter school teachers have
higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS teachers (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011;
Ni, 2012; Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013; Gross, 2011; Roch and Sai, 2015; Roch
and Sai, 2016). The findings of this dissertation are in accordance with this previous
research. Principals and also teachers who work in charter schools enjoy higher levels of
job autonomy than do their counterparts working in TPSs, that is why we see lower levels
of the principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs. Principals are
granted higher levels of job autonomy in charter schools, and they become more likely to
share school-level educational authority with teachers. At the same time, teachers are also
granted higher levels of job autonomy in charter schools and are more engaged in making
decisions on school-related issues. As a result, we see a more even distribution of schoollevel educational authority between principals and teachers in charter schools than in
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TPSs, leading to more collaborative and democratic decision-making processes. This
finding also supports the statements of the previous scholars. Wohlstetter, Smith and
Farrell (2013) found that charter school teachers became more involved, than TPS
teachers, in making decisions related to schooling. Malloy and Wohlstetter (2003: 235)
state that charter school teachers feel involved in school decision making when the
principals create a “sense of team”. Such perception, as Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell
(2013) have argued, may translate into positive behaviors such as greater teacher
commitment to charter schools.
7.3 Charter School Principals Exit at Higher Rates
In this dissertation, I have also explored the turnover rates of principals who
work in different types of charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school
principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. The differences in
turnover rates between charter school principals and TPS principals, however, become
insignificant once I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the
contextual factors of schools. It seems that the differences in the individual characteristics
of principals and the contextual factors of schools drive the higher turnover rates among
charter school principals than those among principals in traditional public schools.
After controlling for the individual characteristics of principals, the positive
coefficient for charter schools decreases but is still significant, which indicates that the
individual characteristics of principals help explain a small aspect of the turnover
behaviors of principals. According to the results of the turnover models, minority
principals are more likely than white principals to leave their positions. The relationship
between age and the turnover rates of principals follows a U-shape distribution. Young
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principals have high turnover rates. As age increases, turnover rates will decrease until
principals become 43 (42.72) years old. Then, the turnover rates will increase as the age
of principals increases. On the other hand, the relationship between the length of
administrative experiences and the turnover rates of principals follows an inverse Ushape distribution. Turnover rates are relatively low for inexperienced principals.
Principals will become more and more likely to leave their positions as they gain more
administrative experiences. Then turnover rates will start to decline along with the
increase of their administrative experiences once they have gained more than 14 (14.36)
years of administrative experiences. Compared to TPS principals, charter school
principals are younger and more likely to be minority, which may lead to higher turnover
rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals. But they are also less
experienced, which may lead to lower turnover rates among charter school principals
than among TPS principals. It is possible that there exists a self-selection process among
public school principals. We observe higher turnover rates among charter school
principals is because those principals who have higher probabilities of turnover (minority
principals, young principals) are more likely to work in charter schools than in TPSs.
After I control for the contextual factors of schools, I find that the positive
coefficient for charter schools becomes insignificant, that is, the contextual factors of
schools explain the main differences in the turnover rates of principals. Principals
working in larger schools are less likely to leave than their counterparts working in
smaller schools. Principals in elementary schools are less likely than principals in
secondary schools to leave their positions. Besides, principals working in schools with
higher proportions of minority students are more likely to exit than principals working in
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schools with low proportions of minority students. Charter schools on average are smaller
than TPSs and are less likely to be elementary schools. They also have higher proportions
of minority students than do TPSs. Therefore, the differences in the school context
between charter schools and TPSs appear to explain why we can see higher turnover rates
among charter school principals than among TPS principals.
The working conditions also help explain an aspect of the exits of principals. I
find that the levels of principals’ job autonomy negatively affect their turnover rates.
Principals’ turnover rates are also affected by the evaluations they receive from the
teachers working in their schools. Teachers’ evaluations show whether teachers think
principals are supportive and encouraging. Principals are less likely to leave their
positions if they are granted higher levels of job autonomy and receive better evaluations
from teachers. The levels of principals’ payment also negatively affect their turnover
rates. In contrast, principals’ weekly workloads positively affect their turnover rates.
Principals will become more likely to stay in their positions if they get higher payments
and lower workloads. After I control for the working conditions of principals, I see a
decrease in the positive and insignificant coefficient for charter schools, signifying that
the higher turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals can
be partially explained by the differences in the working conditions of principals. Charter
school principals do enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals. This
negative effect on turnover rates, however, is outnumbered by the positive effect of the
payment of principals since charter school principals receive lower salaries than do TPS
principals.
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In this dissertation, I have also run a series of models which include the
interaction terms between charter schools and the working conditions of principals. I find
a negative interaction term between charter schools and the levels of principal autonomy,
indicating that principal autonomy has a greater negative effect on the turnover rates
among charter school principals than on those among TPS principals. The levels of
principal autonomy are more influential to charter school principals than to TPS
principals. I also find a negative interaction term between charter schools and the annual
salary of principals, signifying that payment also has a greater negative effect on the
turnover rates among charter school principals than on those among TPS principals.
After distinguishing among EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter
schools, I find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools exit at higher rates than
do TPS principals, that is why we see higher turnover rates among charter school
principals than among TPS principals. As for other charter school principals who work in
EMO-managed and regular charter schools, their turnover rates do not obviously differ
from those of TPS principals. The size of the positive coefficient for CMO-managed
charter schools keeps decreasing as I add in the control variables step by step, signifying
that those principal- and school-related factors can explain a part of the differences in the
turnover rates of principals. However, the positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter
schools is still significant in the fully specified model. Some invisible factors that are not
controlled for by my models help drive the differences in the turnover rates of principals
between CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. The uncontrolled factors may be
related to the cultural context of schools. CMO-managed charter schools sometimes have
school cultures that support and encourage long work hours such as 60 hours to 80 hours
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per week. They also require employees to focus on meeting the mission and the goals of
the school. This type of culture may be attractive to some principals with high levels of
passion on the mission of the school, but may also facilitate the burnout and turnover of
other principals (Torres, 2014; Lake, Dusseault, Bowen, Demeritt and Hill, 2010).
Similarly, I have run another series of models in which I add in the interaction
terms between each type of charter schools and the working conditions of principals. I
find significant negative interaction terms between EMO-managed charter schools and
the annual salaries of principals and between regular charter schools and the annual
salaries of principals. It seems that payment has a greater negative effect on the turnover
rates among principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools than among TPS
principals. Annual salaries are more influential to principals in EMO-managed and
regular charter schools than to TPS principals.
As I have mentioned in chapter 2, no current research has quantitatively assessed
the turnover rates among charter school principals. Past research has only evaluated the
turnover rates among principals in all public schools without distinguishing between
charter schools and TPSs. This previous research has found that in the range of 14-30%
of principals in public schools leave their jobs each year (Battle and Gruber, 2010;
DeAngelis and White, 2011; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown
and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and
Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007; Beteille, Kalogrides and Loeb, 2011). In this
dissertation, I find that around 28% of charter school principals and 22% of TPS
principals leave their jobs from one year to the next. This trend is in accordance with the
findings of prior research.
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There has been much more research that is focused on teacher retention. Some of
this research has compared the turnover rates among charter school teachers with those
among TPS teachers, finding that charter school teachers are more likely to leave their
positions than do TPS teachers (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011; Stuit and Smith,
2009; Stuit and Smith, 2012; Cannata, 2010). Roch and Sai (2015) found that teachers
working EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools had higher levels of turnover
intention than did teachers working in regular charter schools. In this dissertation, I find
that charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions.
I also find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher turnover rates
than do principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools as well as TPS
principals.
Gross (2011) has mentioned that starting a new charter school involves many
challenges such as creating and supporting a vision, acquiring facilities, designing
instructional programs, recruiting teachers and staff, managing budgets and payroll, and
enrolling students, which bring added responsibilities to charter school principals.
Operating an existing charter school is also a tough task for principals. Traditional public
systems provide vital guidance and resources to school principals, which may help
lighten the burden of school principals. Charter school principals, in contrast, have to rely
more on themselves and are faced with demanding workloads. It is not surprising that we
see higher turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals.
Charter school principals appear to be more mobile than TPS principals, but we are
unclear about whether charter school principals are less embedded in the public education
system and are more likely to move to the private sector than TPS principals. Prior
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research on principal turnover does not provide useful information, and the data of this
dissertation cannot answer this question either. It would be helpful if future versions of
the Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) included a question asking whether principals
leave for a position in the private education system or private sector generally.
7.4 The Contributions and Limitations of This Study
This comprehensive quantitative study contributes to the literature on principal
autonomy, the principal-teacher power differential, and principal turnover. My findings
support and supplement the previous research on principal autonomy. I have shown that
charter school principals, in particular those of regular charter schools, are granted higher
levels of job autonomy than TPS principals. I have also shown that charter schools
provide both principals and teachers with higher levels of job autonomy and charter
school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share the decision-making
powers with teachers and engage teachers in decision-making processes.
In addition, this dissertation provides job characteristics theory with empirical
evidence, showing that the levels of job autonomy negatively affect the turnover rates of
principals. Charter school principals enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS
principals; however, they still exit at higher rates than do TPS principals because other
principal- and school-related factors in general lead to higher turnover rates among
charter school principals than among TPS principals. I have also demonstrated the role
that salary and workloads play in determining the turnover rates of principals. Principals
will be more likely to leave their jobs if they receive lower salaries and have higher
weekly workloads. Besides, charter school principals are more concerned with job
autonomy and salary than TPS principals. The levels of principal autonomy and annual
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salaries both have a larger negative effect on the turnover rates among charter school
principals than on those among TPS principals.
In this study, I find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools exit at
higher rates than do principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools and TPS
principals. The models I have established in this dissertation, however, provide little
evidence of which factors appear most important in driving the higher turnover rates
among principals in CMO-managed charter schools. The significant and positive
coefficient reflects these uncontrolled for factors. I conjecture that some factors are
related to school philosophy and school culture, which I cannot measure in this study,
may help explain the differences we observe in the turnover rates of principals between
CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. We need more comprehensive models, which
can control for culture-related factors, to explore what factors help drive the higher
turnover rates among principals in CMO-managed charter schools.
Besides, the sample of this study includes a relatively small number of EMOand CMO-managed charter schools since MO-managed charter schools only make up a
small proportion of existing public schools in reality. As I have mentioned in chapter 3,
the sample of this study over represents the schools managed by large-scale EMOs and
under represents the schools managed by medium-scale EMOs. It also slightly over
represents the schools managed by small-scale EMOs. On the other hand, the sample of
this study slightly under represents the schools managed by large- and small-scale CMOs
and over represents the schools managed by medium-scale CMOs. Therefore, the
conclusions about EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools may not be as solid as the
ones about regular charter schools and TPSs.
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This study suggests that policy makers should pay careful attention to the levels
of job autonomy that are offered to school principals if they plan to decrease the turnover
rates among public school principals. They may also need to consider carefully the
payment they offer to school principals and the relationships between school principals
and teachers. Higher levels of payment and more harmonious relationships between
principals and teachers may help restrain the higher turnover rates among public school
principals. I believe that future work should continue to explore and assess how CMOmanaged charter schools differ from EMO-managed and regular charter schools in school
philosophy and school culture as well as in other principal- and school-related factors,
seeing why principals in CMO-managed charter schools show higher turnover rates than
do their counterparts working in other charter schools and in TPSs. Future work should
also work on verifying my conclusions about EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools
as those conclusions of this study may be relatively tentative.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSES

Table 17: Dependent Variables: Principal Autonomy
How much actual influence do you think you have as a principal on decision concerning
the following activities?
Variable
Student Performance
Standards

Survey Item
A0083: Setting performance
standards for students of this
school

Curriculum

A0084: Establishing
curriculum at this school

Teacher Professional
Development

A0085: Determining the
content of in-service
professional development
programs for teachers of this
school
A0086: Evaluating teachers
of this school

Teacher Evaluation

Teacher Recruitment

A0087: Hiring new full-time
teachers of this school

Discipline Policy

A0088: Setting discipline
policy at this school

School budgets

A0089: Deciding how your
school budgets will be spent

Principal Autonomy

Summated rating scale that
combines A0083 ~ A0089
(alpha=0.57)
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Coded Value
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence
1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate influence
4 = Major influence

Table 18: Dependent Variables: Principal-Teacher Power Differential
How much actual influence do you think you have as a principal on decision concerning
the following activities?
How much actual influence do you think teachers have over school policy at this school
in each of the following areas?
Variable
Power Differential in
Student Performance
Standards
Power Differential in
Curriculum
Power Differential in
Teacher Professional
Development
Power Differential in
Teacher Evaluation
Power Differential in
Teacher Recruitment
Power Differential in
Discipline Policy
Power Differential in
School budgets
The Principal-Teacher
Power Differential

Survey Item
Setting performance
standards for students of
this school
Establishing curriculum at
this school
Determining the content of
in-service professional
development programs for
teachers of this school
Evaluating teachers of this
school
Hiring new full-time
teachers of this school
Setting discipline policy at
this school
Deciding how your school
budgets will be spent
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Coded Value
A0083 - the school-level
mean of T0420
A0084 - the school-level
mean of T0421
A0085 - the school-level
mean of T0422

A0086 - the school-level
mean of T0423
A0087 - the school-level
mean of T0424
A0088 - the school-level
mean of T0425
A0089 - the school-level
mean of T0426
Principal Autonomy - the
school-level mean of the
School-wide Influence of
Teachers

Table 19: Dependent Variable: Principal Turnover
Variable
Turnover

Survey Item
Which of the following best
describes the current
occupational status of last
year’s Principal?
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Coded Value
1 = Still working as a Principal, but
not at this school
OR Still working in a K-12 school,
but not as a Principal
OR Still working in K-12 Education,
but not in a K-12 school
OR Working at a job outside of K-12
Education
OR Other (Retired, On leave,
Deceased, etc.)
0 = Still working as Principal of this
school

Table 20: Independent Variables: Individual Characteristics of Principal
Variable
Female

Survey Item
Are you male or female?

Minority

What is your race?

Age
Master’s
Degree

What is your year of birth?
Is the highest degree you have earned a
master’s degree (M.A., M.A.T., M.B.A.,
M.Ed., M.S., etc.)?
Is the highest degree you have earned an
educational specialist or a professional diploma
(at least one year beyond master’s level) OR a
doctorate or first professional degree (Ph.D.,
Ed.D., M.D., L.L.B., J.D., D.D.S.)?
Prior to this school year, how many years did
you serve as the principal of this or any other
school?

Doctoral
Degree

Principal
Experience
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Coded Value
1 = Female
0 = Male
1 = Minority
0 = Non-Hispanic
white
___ Years old
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No

___ Years

Table 21: Independent Variables: Contextual Factors of School
Variable

Survey Item

CHARTER

Is this school a public charter school?

EMO

Is this charter school a part of a for-profit charter
management organization or network of schools
that are managed by a central agency?
Is this charter school a part of a non-profit charter
management organization or network of schools
that are managed by a central agency?
Is this charter school an independent or standalone charter school OR a part of a traditional
public school district?
Around the first of October, how many students in
grades K-12 and comparable ungraded levels were
enrolled in this school?
Is this school an elementary school?

CMO

REGULAR

Enrollment

Elementary
Combined
Urban

Is this school a combined elementary and
secondary school?
Is this school in a city?

Suburban

Is this school in a suburban area?

% Minority
Teachers
% Minority
Students
% Low-income
Students

How many percentages of teachers at this school
are racial or ethnic minorities?
How many percentages of students at this school
are racial or ethnic minorities?
How many percentages of students at this school
are approved for free or reduced-price lunches?
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Coded
Value
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
___Students

1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
___%
___%
___%

Table 22: Independent Variables: Working Conditions of Principal
Variable
Weekly Work Hours

Annual Salary

Union Membership

Student Discipline
Behaviors

Parental Involvement

Survey Item
Including hours spent during the school
day, before and after school, and on the
weekends, how many hours do you
spend on all school-related activities
during a typical full week at this school?
What is your current annual salary for
your position in this school before taxes
and deduction?
Are you represented under a meet-andconfer agreement or a collective
bargaining agreement?
To the best of your knowledge, how
often do the following types of problems
occur at this school?
a. Physical conflicts among students
b. Robbery or theft
c. Vandalism
d. Student use of alcohol
e. Student use of illegal drugs
f. Student possession of weapons
g. Physical abuse of teachers
h. Student racial tensions
i. Student bullying
j. Student verbal abuse of teachers
k. Widespread disorder in classrooms
l. Student acts of disrespect for teachers
m. Gang activities
Last school year (2010-11), what
percentage of students had at least one
parent or guardian participating in the
following events?
a. Open house or back-to-school night
b. All regularly scheduled school-wide
parent-teacher conferences
c. Special subject-area events (e.g.,
science fair, concerts)
d. Parent education workshops or
courses
e. Signing of a school-parent compact
f. Volunteer in the school as needed or
on a regular basis
g. Involvement in school instructional
issues (e.g., planning classroom learning
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Coded Value
___ Total weekly
hours spend on
school-related
activities
$___ per year

1 = Yes
0 = No
0 = Never happens
1 = Happens on
occasion
2 = Happens at least
once a month
3 = Happens at least
once a week
4 = Happens daily

1 = 0 – 25%
2 = 25 – 50%
3 = 51 – 75%
4 = 76 – 100%

Table 22 (continued)
Variable

Student Motivation

Classroom Control of
Teachers

School-wide
Influence of Teachers

Survey Item
activities, providing feedback on
curriculum)
h. Involvement in governance (e.g.,
PTA or PTO meetings, school board,
parent booster clubs)
i. Involvement in budget decisions
To what extent is each of the following
a problem in this school?
a. Student tardiness
b. Student absenteeism
c. Student class cutting
e. Student dropping out
f. Student apathy
i. Students come to school unprepared to
learn
How much actual control do you have in
your classroom at this school over the
following areas of your planning and
teaching?
a. Selecting textbooks and other
instructional materials
b. Selecting content, topics, and skills to
be taught
c. Selecting teaching techniques
d. Evaluating and grading students
e. Disciplining students
f. Determining the amount of homework
to be assigned
How much actual influence do you think
teachers have over school policy at this
school in each of the following areas?
a (T0420). Setting performance
standards for students at this school
b (T0421). Establishing curriculum
c (T0422). Determining the content of
in-service professional development
programs
d (T0423). Evaluating teachers
e (T0424). Hiring new full-time teachers
f (T0425). Setting discipline policy
g (T0426). Deciding how the school
budgets will be spent
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Coded Value

1 = Serious problem
2 = Moderate
problem
3 = Minor problem
4 = Not a problem

1 = No control
2 = Minor control
3 = Moderate
control
4 = A great deal of
control

1 = No influence
2 = Minor influence
3 = Moderate
influence
4 = A great deal of
influence

Table 22 (continued)
Variable
Teachers’
Evaluations of
Principal

Identified for
Improvement

Survey Item
To what extent do you agree or disagree
with each of the following statements?
a. The school administration’s behavior
towards the staff is supportive and
encouraging.
g. My principal enforces school rules for
student conduct and backs me up when
U need it.
j. The principal knows what kind of
school he or she wants and has
communicated it to the staff.
o. I am given the support I need to teach
students with special needs.
At the end of the last school year (201011), was this school identified for
improvement due to Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) requirements?
(A school is identified for improvement
if it does not make Adequate Yearly
Progress for two consecutive years or
more in the same content area)
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Coded Value
1 = Strongly
disagree
2 = Somewhat
disagree
3 = Somewhat agree
4 = Strongly agree

1 = Yes
0 = No

APPENDIX B
ORDERED LOGIT MODELS OF PRINCIPAL AUTONOMY

Table 23: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
D1
Model 1
Charter
0.96***
(0.21)
Cut1
-3.62***
(0.11)
Cut2
-2.53***
(0.07)
Cut3
-0.98***
(0.04)

D2

D3

D4

0.91***
(0.19)
-3.07***
(0.09)
-1.33***
(0.05)
0.34***
(0.04)

0.44***
(0.15)
-4.71***
(0.23)
-2.80***
(0.08)
-0.81***
(0.04)

-1.01***
(0.24)
-6.31***
(0.57)
-5.26***
(0.25)
-3.39***
(0.09)

D5

D6

-0.57***
0.29
0.12
(0.18)
(0.47)
(0.17)
-4.48*** -4.42*** -5.39***
(0.15)
(0.18)
(0.29)
-2.30*** -3.14*** -3.86***
(0.05)
(0.10)
(0.11)
-0.60*** -1.80*** -1.41***
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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D7

Table 24: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy (Full Model): CSs vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 2
Charter

D1

D2

D3

D4

0.925***
(0.213)

0.878***
(0.200)

0.364**
(0.151)

-0.782**
(0.313)

0.116
(0.0774)
0.207**
(0.104)
0.0832*
(0.0487)
-0.252
(0.300)
-0.277
(0.276)
-0.0277
(0.0670)

0.357***
(0.0851)
-0.0751
(0.113)
-0.0759
(0.0546)
-0.124
(0.378)
-0.0492
(0.377)
-0.0610
(0.0619)

0.336*
(0.199)
0.390
(0.277)
0.210
(0.143)
0.670
(0.510)
0.797
(0.525)
0.0233
(0.195)

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.0425
(0.0953)
Minority
0.188
(0.132)
Age (+10)
-0.106**
(0.0538)
Master’s
0.394
(0.392)
Doctoral
0.492
(0.393)
Experience (+10)
0.133*
(0.0796)

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
-0.00785 -0.0251*** 0.0239***
-0.0176
(0.00701) (0.00678)
(0.00786)
(0.0154)
Elementary
-0.0957
-0.504***
0.0116
0.233
(0.0818)
(0.0695)
(0.0801)
(0.173)
Combined
-0.171
0.113
0.203
0.0837
(0.128)
(0.138)
(0.125)
(0.318)
Urban
0.0746
-0.618***
0.0419
-0.699***
(0.122)
(0.109)
(0.111)
(0.269)
Suburban
-0.165
-0.533***
-0.314*** -0.847***
(0.0993)
(0.0881)
(0.0991)
(0.229)
% Minority Teachers
0.00608** 0.00821***
0.00179
-0.00652
(0.00287) (0.00241)
(0.00303)
(0.00623)
% Minority Students
-0.00128 -0.00425***
0.00102
0.00678*
(0.00196) (0.00162)
(0.00204)
(0.00404)
% Low-income Students -0.000801 -1.01e-06 -0.00326*** -0.00894**
(0.00162) (0.00153)
(0.00136)
(0.00375)
Cut1
-3.724*** -3.782***
-5.093*** -5.046***
(0.509)
(0.409)
(0.504)
(0.811)
Cut2
-2.638*** -2.015***
-3.180*** -3.992***
(0.498)
(0.403)
(0.453)
(0.660)
Cut3
-1.078**
-0.270
-1.172**
-2.116***
(0.503)
(0.393)
(0.448)
(0.683)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 24 (continued)
Variable
Model 2
Charter

D5

D6

D7

-0.468**
(0.189)

0.521
(0.463)

0.283
(0.196)

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.150*
(0.0813)
Minority
-0.0920
(0.109)
Age (+10)
0.136***
(0.0475)
Master’s
0.321
(0.359)
Doctoral
0.411
(0.355)
Experience (+10)
-0.0366
(0.0706)

0.138
0.0286
(0.127)
(0.0946)
-0.403*** -0.223*
(0.148)
(0.123)
0.0935
0.147**
(0.0743) (0.0591)
-0.687
0.554
(0.462)
(0.422)
-0.765
0.449
(0.457)
(0.421)
-0.00733
0.0198
(0.116)
(0.0872)

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.0294***
(0.00706)
Elementary
0.367***
(0.0705)
Combined
-0.422***
(0.107)
Urban
0.230**
(0.113)
Suburban
-0.0914
(0.0939)
% Minority Teachers
0.00102
(0.00261)
% Minority Students
0.00357**
(0.00179)
% Low-income Students -0.00507***
(0.00144)
Cut1
-3.157***
(0.430)
Cut2
-0.965**
(0.433)
Cut3
0.776*
(0.436)

0.0212*
(0.0119)
-0.207**
(0.102)
-0.384
(0.245)
-0.345**
(0.160)
-0.483***
(0.146)
0.00108
(0.00384)
-0.00302
(0.00304)
-0.00524*
(0.00277)
-5.406***
(0.596)
-4.112***
(0.554)
-2.753***
(0.557)

-0.0133*
(0.00735)
0.0752
(0.0915)
-0.0140
(0.127)
-0.0175
(0.113)
-0.0482
(0.107)
-0.00149
(0.00321)
-0.000095
(0.00226)
-0.000349
(0.00194)
-4.292***
(0.582)
-2.759***
(0.445)
-0.294
(0.448)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 25: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy: Each Type of CSs vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 1
EMO
CMO
Regular
Cut1
Cut2
Cut3

D1
1.09
(2.43)
0.98**
(0.45)
0.94***
(0.25)
-3.62***
(0.11)
-2.53***
(0.07)
-0.98***
(0.04)

D2

D3

D4

D5

D6

D7

0.75
0.19
-0.99 -1.15***
0.49
-0.09
(0.56)
(0.57)
(6.81)
(0.44)
(5.74)
(1.79)
0.66**
0.41
-1.21 -0.95***
1.34
0.16
(0.31)
(0.45)
(1.75)
(0.32)
(3.58)
(0.43)
1.00*** 0.47* -0.95*** -0.40*
0.08
0.14
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.53)
(0.20)
-3.07*** -4.71*** -6.31*** -4.48*** -4.43*** -5.39***
(0.09)
(0.23)
(0.57)
(0.15)
(0.18)
(0.29)
-1.33*** -2.80*** -5.26*** -2.30*** -3.14*** -3.86***
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.25)
(0.05)
(0.10)
(0.11)
0.34*** -0.81*** -3.39*** -0.60*** -1.80*** -1.41***
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.09)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 26: Principal Autonomy (Full Model): Each Type of CSs vs. TPSs
Variable
Model 2
EMO
CMO
Regular

D1

D2

D3

D4

1.074
(2.508)
1.013**
(0.461)
0.885***
(0.253)

1.055
(0.554)
0.622**
(0.315)
0.934***
(0.262)

0.107
(0.599)
0.340
(0.466)
0.400*
(0.237)

-0.597
(7.030)
-0.724
(1.807)
-0.822**
(0.352)

0.116
(0.0771)
0.203*
(0.105)
0.0825*
(0.0485)
-0.272
(0.300)
-0.298
(0.277)
-0.0275
(0.0669)

0.357***
(0.0852)
-0.0745
(0.113)
-0.0763
(0.0548)
-0.123
(0.375)
-0.0494
(0.375)
-0.0609
(0.0620)

0.335*
(0.199)
0.390
(0.280)
0.212
(0.145)
0.678
(0.518)
0.806
(0.527)
0.0224
(0.196)

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.0425
(0.0952)
Minority
0.188
(0.132)
Age (+10)
-0.106**
(0.0539)
Master’s
0.398
(0.397)
Doctoral
0.496
(0.396)
Experience (+10)
0.133*
(0.0798)

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
-0.00795 -0.0252*** 0.0240***
-0.0181
(0.00706) (0.00679)
(0.00786)
(0.0157)
Elementary
-0.0962
-0.505***
0.0123
0.231
(0.0819)
(0.0696)
(0.0802)
(0.175)
Combined
-0.172
0.114
0.205
0.0788
(0.128)
(0.137)
(0.125)
(0.322)
Urban
0.0748
-0.620***
0.0424
-0.699***
(0.122)
(0.109)
(0.111)
(0.270)
Suburban
-0.165
-0.532*** -0.313*** -0.848***
(0.0994)
(0.0881)
(0.0997)
(0.230)
% Minority Teachers
0.00609** 0.00823*** 0.00175
-0.00645
(0.00287) (0.00241)
(0.00303) (0.00621)
% Minority Students
-0.00128 -0.00422*** 0.00101
0.00679*
(0.00196) (0.00162)
(0.00204) (0.00404)
% Low-income Students -0.000823 0.0000370 -0.00323** -0.00903**
(0.00162) (0.00152)
(0.00137) (0.00378)
Cut1
-3.721*** -3.804*** -5.091*** -5.042***
(0.511)
(0.409)
(0.504)
(0.821)
Cut2
-2.635*** -2.037*** -3.179*** -3.988***
(0.502)
(0.404)
(0.450)
(0.679)
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Table 26 (continued)
Variable
Cut3

D1
-1.076**
(0.506)

D2
-0.291
(0.393)

D3
-1.171**
(0.445)

D4
-2.112***
(0.715)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 26 (continued)
Variable
Model 2
EMO
CMO
Regular

D5

D6

D7

-1.076**
(0.442)
-0.767**
(0.354)
-0.327*
(0.232)

0.914
(5.647)
1.640
(3.597)
0.281
(0.523)

0.0870
(1.716)
0.434
(0.508)
0.264
(0.213)

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
0.149*
0.136
(0.0817)
(0.126)
Minority
-0.0912
-0.399***
(0.110)
(0.149)
Age (+10)
0.135***
0.0963
(0.0472)
(0.0748)
Master’s
0.296
-0.633
(0.361)
(0.459)
Doctoral
0.384
-0.705
(0.357)
(0.451)
Experience (+10)
-0.0361
-0.00765
(0.0702)
(0.116)

0.0286
(0.0946)
-0.221*
(0.123)
0.147***
(0.0590)
0.569
(0.440)
0.465
(0.440)
0.0200
(0.0874)

Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
0.03***
(0.00711)
Elementary
0.370***
(0.0703)
Combined
-0.418***
(0.106)
Urban
0.230**
(0.112)
Suburban
-0.0887
(0.0941)
% Minority Teachers
0.000928
(0.00260)
% Minority Students
0.00357**
(0.00180)
% Low-income Students -0.00491***
(0.00142)
Cut1
-3.180***
(0.428)
Cut2
-0.986**
(0.433)

-0.0132*
(0.00736)
0.0757
(0.0915)
-0.0141
(0.128)
-0.0162
(0.113)
-0.0480
(0.107)
-0.00152
(0.00323)
-0.000116
(0.00226)
-0.000354
(0.00194)
-4.275***
(0.591)
-2.742***
(0.459)

0.0206*
(0.0119)
-0.209**
(0.102)
-0.388
(0.247)
-0.343**
(0.161)
-0.486***
(0.145)
0.00117
(0.00383)
-0.00307
(0.00302)
-0.00542**
(0.00269)
-5.353***
(0.602)
-4.059***
(0.563)
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Table 26 (continued)
Variable
Cut3

D5
0.756*
(0.435)

D6
-2.699***
(0.566)

D7
-0.277
(0.463)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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APPENDIX C
LOGIT MODELS OF PRINCIPAL TURNOVER

Table 27: Principal Turnover: Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools
Variable
Charter School

Model 1
0.340***
(0.135)

Model 2
0.311**
(0.141)

Model 3
0.112
(0.153)

Principal Autonomy

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female

-0.142
(0.093)
0.217**
(0.111)
-0.151***
(0.039)
0.002***
(0.0004)
0.219
(0.345)
0.264
(0.342)
0.039**
(0.017)
-0.002***
(0.0006)

Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Experience
Experience2
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)

-0.156
-0.181*
(0.097)
(0.100)
-0.022
-0.074
(0.124)
(0.129)
-0.150*** -0.154***
(0.041)
(0.042)
0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.261
0.314
(0.350)
(0.342)
0.333
0.442
(0.351)
(0.343)
0.045*** 0.060***
(0.017)
(0.018)
-0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
-0.032***
(0.0001)
-0.145*
(0.084)
0.126
(0.160)
0.001
(0.126)
-0.009
(0.103)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)

Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
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Model 4
0.096
(0.163)
-0.281**
(0.134)

-0.029**
(0.0001)
-0.158
(0.127)
0.043
(0.176)
0.076
(0.133)
0.141
(0.111)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)

Table 27 (continued)
Variable
% Low-income Students

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
-0.001
(0.002)

Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control

-0.055
(0.143)
-0.053
(0.140)
-0.578***
(0.118)
0.171
(0.130)
0.013
(0.117)
0.017
(0.088)
-0.103
(0.108)
-0.0086***
(0.0023)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.075
(0.092)

Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

Constant

Model 4
-0.002
(0.002)

-1.262***
(0.0366)

1.291
(0.901)

1.330
(0.939)

4.709***
(1.275)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 27 (Continued)
Variable
Charter School
Principal Autonomy

Model 5
3.811*
(2.301)
-0.227*
(0.138)

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
-0.180*
(0.101)
Minority
-0.068
(0.129)
Age
-0.153***
(0.042)
2
Age
0.002***
(0.0004)
Master’s Degree
0.350
(0.362)
Doctoral Degree
0.483
(0.365)
Experience
0.061***
(0.018)
Experience2
-0.002***
(0.0007)
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
-0.029**
(0.0001)
Elementary
-0.157
(0.127)
Combined
0.043
(0.179)
Urban
0.072
(0.133)
Suburban
0.142
(0.111)
% Minority Teachers
0.002
(0.003)
% Minority Students
0.005**
(0.002)
% Low-income Students
-0.002
(0.002)
Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
-0.050
(0.143)
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Model 6
1.905***
(0.703)
-0.266**
(0.134)

-0.183*
(0.100)
-0.077
(0.130)
-0.151***
(0.042)
0.002***
(0.0004)
0.442
(0.347)
0.567
(0.348)
0.059***
(0.018)
-0.002***
(0.0007)
-0.029**
(0.0001)
-0.157
(0.128)
0.064
(0.177)
0.056
(0.134)
0.125
(0.112)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.046
(0.145)

Table 27 (continued)
Variable
Teachers’ School-wide Influence

Model 5
Model 6
-0.050
-0.057
(0.141)
(0.141)
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal -0.584*** -0.583***
(0.118)
(0.118)
Student Discipline Problems
0.174
0.178
(0.130)
(0.130)
Student Motivation
0.017
0.026
(0.117)
(0.117)
Parental Involvement
0.021
0.020
(0.089)
(0.088)
Poor School Performance
-0.099
-0.106
(0.108)
(0.107)
Annual Salary (+$1000)
-0.0085*** -0.0071***
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
0.006*
0.006*
(0.003)
(0.003)
Union Membership
-0.073
-0.084
(0.092)
(0.092)
Interaction Terms
Principal Autonomy * Charter

-1.01*
(0.614)

Annual Salary (+$1000) * Charter

Constant

-0.023***
(0.009)
4.400***
(1.307)

4.275***
(1.296)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 28: Principal Turnover: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs
Variable
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.180
0.171
0.135
(0.791)
(0.843)
(0.846)
0.936*** 0.931*** 0.676***
(0.241)
(0.267)
(0.265)
0.162
0.146
-0.055
(0.153)
(0.155)
(0.173)

Principal Autonomy

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female

-0.143
(0.093)
0.221**
(0.111)
-0.144***
(0.039)
0.002***
(0.0004)
0.307
(0.364)
0.355
(0.363)
0.039**
(0.017)
-0.002***
(0.0006)

Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Experience
Experience2
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)

-0.157
-0.180*
(0.097)
(0.100)
-0.014
-0.065
(0.123)
(0.128)
-0.143*** -0.148***
(0.041)
(0.042)
0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.339
0.390
(0.368)
(0.360)
0.415
0.522
(0.370)
(0.363)
0.045*** 0.060***
(0.017)
(0.018)
-0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
-0.032***
(0.010)
-0.145*
(0.085)
0.120
(0.161)
0.005
(0.126)
-0.011
(0.103)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)

Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students
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Model 4
0.120
(0.799)
0.637**
(0.257)
-0.069
(0.183)
-0.278**
(0.134)

-0.029**
(0.012)
-0.158
(0.128)
0.038
(0.176)
0.081
(0.133)
0.141
(0.112)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)

Table 28 (continued)
Variable
Model 1
Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control

Model 2

Model 3

-0.054
(0.143)
-0.049
(0.140)
-0.577***
(0.118)
0.174
(0.130)
0.014
(0.117)
0.014
(0.088)
-0.102
(0.108)
-0.0087***
(0.0022)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.073
(0.092)

Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

Constant

-1.262***
(0.037)

Model 4

1.034
(0.919)

1.101
(0.955)

4.481***
(1.289)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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Table 28 (continued)
Variable
EMO Charter
CMO Charter
Regular Charter
Principal Autonomy

Individual Characteristics of Principal
Female
Minority
Age
Age2
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Experience
Experience2
Contextual Factors of School
Enrollment (+100)
Elementary
Combined
Urban
Suburban
% Minority Teachers
% Minority Students
% Low-income Students

Model 5
2.013**
(1.116)
2.554**
(0.735)
1.785*
(0.695)
-0.263*
(0.134)

-0.182*
(0.101)
-0.068
(0.129)
-0.146***
(0.042)
0.002***
(0.0004)
0.525*
(0.358)
0.654**
(0.358)
0.059***
(0.018)
-0.002***
(0.001)
-0.029***
(0.0001)
-0.156
(0.128)
0.062
(0.176)
0.062
(0.135)
0.125
(0.112)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)

145

Table 28 (continued)
Variable
Working Conditions of Principal
Teachers’ Classroom Control
Teachers’ School-wide Influence
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal
Student Discipline Problems
Student Motivation
Parental Involvement
Poor School Performance
Annual Salary (+$1000)
Weekly Workload (hrs)
Union Membership

Model 5
-0.046
(0.145)
-0.053
(0.141)
-0.583***
(0.118)
0.180
(0.131)
0.028
(0.117)
0.018
(0.088)
-0.105
(0.108)
-0.0072***
(0.0023)
0.006
(0.003)
-0.081
(0.092)

Interaction Terms
Annual Salary (+$1000) * EMO Charter

-0.026***
(0.011)
Annual Salary (+$1000) * CMO Charter
-0.036
(0.009)
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Regular Charter -0.026*
(0.009)
Constant

4.041***
(1.300)

4.036***
(1.304)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS.
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